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Mankind currently is not only facing a major environmental challenge, it is embarking 
on a hugely risky enterprise — that of climate mitigation. This unprecedented global 
adventure is an attempt to change the nature and shape of human society on the 
grounds that our traditional market system has failed us. The current enterprise is 
hugely risky because it is based not on what has happened but on what we are told by 
“climate-mitigation engineers” might happen. 
The argument in this essay is simple but powerful, and can be outlined in the 
following five propositions: 
•  The science of climate change is challenging but compelling, based as it is on 
an impressive and growing body of expert empirical research. What it shows 
is that recent climate change is human induced. Hence, further climate change 
and its mitigation are problems primarily for the social not natural sciences. 
•  The “science” of climate mitigation is nonexistent, because orthodox social 
science has failed to model the dynamics of human society. And it is the 
dynamics of human society that will largely determine future climate change. 
•  Orthodox economics, which has attempted to fill the void, has failed 
completely. Economic theory is suitable only for the analysis of small, short-
run issues that can be accommodated within a static framework — such as the 
price of a cup of tea; whereas the issue of climate mitigation is one of the 
biggest and most important issues humanity will ever face, it is long-run in 
nature, and it can only be adequately handled within a dynamic framework. As 
orthodox economics has been unable to develop a realist general dynamic 
theory, its practitioners have been forced to employ simplistic historicist 
models when analyzing future climate change. 
•  What we need is a new science of human dynamics. The basis for this new 
science is provided by the author’s dynamic-strategy theory. It is a realist 
theory in the sense that it has been derived from a long-term, systematic 
observation of the fluctuating fortunes of both human society over the past 2 
million years (myrs) and life over the past 4,000 myrs. 
•  Economists have massively underestimated the costs of their proposed climate 
mitigation program aimed at stabilizing greenhouse-gas concentrations, 
because they have employed the inadequate static cost–benefit methodology. 
This essay takes a very different approach. By estimating the dynamic costs — 
essentially the costs of suppressing the imminent technological revolution that 
can only be identified in a realist dynamic framework — I have found that 
total costs will be almost 100 times greater than current estimates by the year 
2100. This puts a comprehensive mitigation program totally out of the 
question. What, then, is to be done? This essay provides the answer. 
Key words: climate mitigation, technological revolution, human dynamics,             
economic intervention, dynamic costs and benefits.  
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A New Technological Revolution 
Mankind currently is not only facing a major environmental challenge, it is embarking 
on a hugely risky enterprise — that of climate mitigation. This unprecedented global 
adventure is an attempt to change the nature and shape of human society on the 
grounds that our traditional market system has failed us. The current enterprise is 
hugely risky because it is based not on what has happened but on what we are told by 
“climate-mitigation engineers” might happen. 
THE ESSAY’S ARGUMENT 
The essay’s argument is simple but powerful, and can be outlined in the following 
five propositions: 
•  The science of climate change is challenging but compelling, based as it is on 
an impressive and growing body of expert empirical research. What it shows 
is that recent climate change is human induced. Hence, further climate change 
and its mitigation are problems primarily for the social not natural sciences. 
•  The “science” of climate mitigation is nonexistent, because orthodox social 
science has failed to model the dynamics of human society. And it is the 
dynamics of human society that will largely determine future climate change. 
•  Orthodox economics, which has attempted to fill the void, has failed 
completely. Economic theory is suitable only for the analysis of small, short-
run issues that can be accommodated within a static framework — such as the 
price of a cup of tea; whereas the issue of climate mitigation is one of the 
biggest and most important issues humanity will ever face, it is long-run in 
nature, and it can only be adequately handled within a dynamic framework. As 
orthodox economics has been unable to develop a realist general dynamic 
theory, its practitioners have been forced to employ simplistic historicist 
models when analyzing future climate change. 
•  What we need is a new science of human dynamics. The basis for this new 
science is provided by the author’s dynamic-strategy theory. It is a realist 
theory in the sense that it has been derived from a long-term, systematic 
observation of the fluctuating fortunes of both human society over the past 2 
million years (myrs) and life over the past 4,000 myrs. 
•  Economists have massively underestimated the costs of their proposed climate 
mitigation program aimed at stabilizing greenhouse-gas concentrations, 
because they have employed the inadequate static cost–benefit methodology. 
This essay takes a very different approach. By estimating the dynamic costs — 
essentially the costs of suppressing the imminent technological revolution that 
can only be identified in a realist dynamic framework — I have found that 
total costs will be almost 100 times greater than current estimates by the year  
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2100. This puts a comprehensive mitigation program totally out of the 
question. What, then, is to be done? This essay provides the answer. 
Even if we accept the climate-change science about the recent relationship 
between human economic activities and climate change — which I do in this essay — 
we have no direct evidence that this relationship will continue to hold during the 
remainder of the twenty-first century and beyond. We can only “know” the future 
indirectly through the construction of theoretical models that make persuasive 
predictions about the behavior of humanity and the outcomes of our activity 
throughout the course of this century. Our “knowledge” of the future, therefore, is 
only as good as the ability of our models to anticipate the dynamics of human society 
over the next three or four generations. Green-house gas concentration calculations 
cannot be correct if the model of human dynamics is either nonexistent or wrong. 
In this essay I argue that the theoretical models, both climatic and economic, 
the experts have so far employed to estimate the range of possible future greenhouse-
gas concentrations, resulting temperature increases, and costs of both “business as 
usual” and mitigation/adaptation policies, are totally inappropriate. Indeed, these 
conventional models have generated future projections that are hopelessly and 
dangerously wrong. We are told, for example, that the costs of mitigation will amount 
to “only” about 1 percent of world GDP each and every year (currently around 
$656.1 billion — only slightly less than the size of Australia’s GDP, of $773 billion, 
for a year), whereas a realist dynamic analysis shows that these costs will amount to 
12 percent of world GDP by 2050 and 90 percent by 2100. 
If this is so, how could the conventional economic models be so wrong? The 
answer is that despite their rapidly growing technical sophistication, these models are, 
at their core, exercises in naive historicism and, hence, are examples of what Karl 
Popper (1957) rightly called “the poverty of historicism” — of assuming that the 
future, even the distant future, will amount to little more than a repetition of the recent 
past. Basically these climate-mitigation models extrapolate recent trends in the key 
climatic and economic variables into the distant future. What’s wrong with this? Well, 
while these models make a variety of assumptions about the ways in which key 
economic variables — population, living standards, energy use per unit of GDP, and 
carbon dioxide emissions per unit of energy use — might change over time, they are 
unable to anticipate any major structural changes –– on the relative scale of the 
Industrial Revolution –– that might take place in human society. 
Why then are possible future revolutionary changes ignored? Because 
orthodox economic model-builders have failed to employ a realist general dynamic 
theory to predict where human society might go in the future and how they might get 
there. A century is a very long time over which to make projections using simplistic 
historicist models. Compound interest soon makes nonsense of estimates based on 
faulty premises. Only with the construction and use of a realist general dynamic 
theory is it possible to predict and explain probably revolutionary structural change 
during the course of the twenty-first century, and beyond. The contribution this essay 
makes to the climate-change debate is the use of such a realist theory to show there is 
a very high probability that a major technological revolution — which, since the early  
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1990s I have called the Solar Revolution (Snooks 1996) — will be well underway by 
the middle decades of the twenty-first century. 
The Solar Revolution will have a similar impact on human society in the 
twenty-first century to that of the Industrial Revolution in the nineteenth century or, 
indeed, to that of the Neolithic Revolution some 10,000 years ago. The unforeseen but 
impending Solar Revolution — not to be confused with the planned transition to a 
“low-carbon” economy proposed by the mitigation engineers who have mistakenly 
appropriated this term — renders all existing projections concerning future 
greenhouse-gas emissions and concentrations, climate changes, and costs of both 
“business as usual” and mitigation, completely redundant. It also exposes the current 
climate mitigation program as being not only unnecessary but also highly dangerous, 
because it will delay, even derail, the emergence of the real Solar Revolution. 
It is worth repeating that this essay largely accepts the climate-change (as 
opposed to the climate-mitigation) science, which has developed rapidly over the past 
two decades. While there are uncertainties arising from the data and models 
employed, the fundamental proposition — that human society has played a major role 
in the climate change experienced since the late 1970s — seems to be well 
established. While this proposition is qualified in Chapter 2, by placing it within a 
wider historical perspective, it is largely accepted. What cannot be accepted, however, 
are the unrealistic historicist models employed by economists to calculate the costs of 
mitigation and as a basis for framing what will be a disastrous mitigation program. 
While the science of climate change is well established, there is no reputable science 
of climate mitigation. 
THE UNFORESEEN BUT IMPENDING ECONOMIC REVOLUTION 
The general dynamic theory employed in this essay is the “dynamic-strategy” theory 
that I’ve been developing in a large number of books and articles over the past couple 
of decades. It is a transdisciplinary theory that has proven its worth in analyzing the 
big issues of human society in the social behavioral, biological and cognitive sciences. 
This theory – which has been published in scientific journals such as Complexity, 
(journal of the Santa Fe Institute) – shows how the human pursuit of survival and 
prosperity has led not only to the rise and fall of civilizations but also to an 
exponential technological development path generated by a number of economic 
revolutions or, what I call, technological paradigm shifts. These include the 
Paleolithic (hunting) Revolution about 1.6 million years (myrs) ago, the Neolithic (or 
agricultural) Revolution about 10,600 years ago, and the Modern (or industrial) 
Revolution about 200 years ago. The interesting feature about this technological 
development path (and the preceding biological one) is that it is exponential in nature, 
both in terms of the process of succession and the rate at which it proceeds. The 
dynamic-strategy theory encompasses these technological paradigm shifts as well as 
the fluctuating fortunes of the civilizations exploiting them. This theory is also used 
for predicting the development of the global technological path in the future. 
The dynamic-strategy theory, as well as real-world evidence concerning the 
current exhaustion of the existing industrial technological paradigm, suggest with a 
high degree of confidence that the new economic revolution — the fourth in the  
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history of humanity — will be well underway by the middle decades of the twenty-
first century. As discussed in Chapter 5, the real Solar Revolution will totally 
transform the sources of, and the ways in which we employ, energy. It will involve a 
shift from all existing energy technologies spawned by the current industrial 
technological paradigm — both the dominant fossil-burning technologies and the 
“low-carbon” alternatives — to technologies directly exploiting the energy of the sun. 
The real Solar Revolution will have an unpredictable transforming impact on 
human society, just as did the three earlier economic revolutions, taking us to even 
higher technological levels. Because of this, the current pressure exerted by an 
exhausting technological paradigm on the environment and global climate will be 
dramatically released. In this event, greenhouse-gas emissions will be equally 
dramatically reduced, global temperatures will cease to rise and will eventually 
decline to more “normal” levels, and the perceived need for climate mitigation will 
evaporate completely. The real Solar Revolution — the predictable outcome of the 
actual dynamic mechanism underlying human society –– will completely resolve the 
climate-change crisis currently generating so much concern. The only climate-change 
action we will need to take is remedial action required to repair damage already done 
to the physical and social environment through climate change actually experienced 
prior to the emergence of the Solar Revolution. 
It is important to realize that climate mitigation and technological revolution 
are totally incompatible. You can have one or the other, but not both. A full-on, 
comprehensive climate-mitigation program will delay, even derail, the Solar 
Revolution during the twenty-first century. As discussed in Chapter 5, a 
comprehensive climate-mitigation program can only be introduced if the “mitigation 
engineers” — the radical climate-change scientists and economists — are able to 
hijack global society and “manage” consumers and producers alike. This program of 
control is being proposed by mitigation engineers such as Nicholas Stern and his 
colleagues in the 2007 Stern Review, as well as contributors to the mitigation volumes 
compiled by the IPCC. Governments are required not only to set mitigation goals and 
manipulate the price mechanism through the imposition of carbon taxes and trading, 
but also to employ a range of regulations, direct interventions, and targeted “sticks 
and carrots” to change consumer demand and to engineer a shift to low-carbon 
technologies. 
These command measures will not only distort the working of global and 
national dynamic mechanisms, but will lock these societies into the old exhausting 
industrial technological paradigm. This process of “technological lock-in” will delay 
the occurrence of the new technological paradigm shift until the mitigation engineers 
lose their influence over national and global public authorities. But if it is not possible 
to dislodge the mitigation engineers, the global economy will very likely end up like 
the USSR under the Bolsheviks, who set Russia off on a metaphysically designed path 
that led to collapse just three generations after embarking on the communist 
experiment in market manipulation. In the extreme scenario where the mitigation 
engineers and their green allies become politically entrenched, forming some sort of 
global directorate, the real Solar Revolution may even be derailed. This extreme 
scenario could lead to the rise of regional strongmen (as in the dying phases of the  
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Roman empire), who would attempt to remove political regimes dominated by 
mitigationists through military means. Some may even turn to conquest as the only 
alternative to the stalled process of technological paradigm change in the eternal 
strategic pursuit. 
Certainly the real Solar Revolution will only proceed once climate mitigation 
has been abandoned. But even then, the cost of this global experiment in economic 
and social manipulation and management will be very high. It will, as shown by the 
calculations in Chapter 5, make a mockery of claims that climate mitigation will cost 
in the vicinity of only 1 percent of world GDP per annum. 
WHAT LIES AHEAD? 
In Chapter 2 — “The Challenge of Climate-Change Science” — the science of 
climate change is briefly reviewed and placed in historical context. Apart from a few 
qualifications, we accept this impressive body of work concerning the past association 
between human economic activities and climate change. Accordingly, there is no need 
to discuss the literature in any great detail. The irony of the scientific argument that 
recent climate change is largely human-induced will be clear. As these scientists 
believe future climate change will depend upon the reaction of, and developments 
within, human society, climate-change science has nothing further to contribute to the 
debate. 
The way is now open for social scientists to show how human society will 
respond to this crisis. Never slow to proclaim their expertise, orthodox economists 
have rushed to fill the void by applying their microeconomic theory of the firm to 
these global issues. This is equivalent to using a nutcracker when only a 
steamhammer will do. In Chapter 3 — “The Limitations of Orthodox Economics” — 
the self-proclaimed expertise of economists on big issues like climate change and the 
dynamics of human society is evaluated. It is argued that while orthodox economists 
do have something useful to say about small issues taking place over short periods of 
time, and which can be analyzed in a static framework, they have are unable to 
illuminate the big issues — like climate change and the future of humanity — 
unfolding over long periods of time, which can only be analyzed in a dynamic 
framework. Indeed, not only do they have little to say about these big issues, what 
they do have to say is both misleading and highly dangerous. As we shall see, 
neoclassical economics consistently and wantonly ignores the dynamic benefits of 
human decision making. 
We need, therefore, to adopt an entirely new approach to climate change and 
the future dynamics of human society. Before it is too late. This new approach is 
explored in Chapter 4 — “The Science of Human Dynamics” — where the dynamic-
strategy theory is briefly outlined in plain English. Essentially the dynamic-strategy 
theory is concerned with the operation of a self-starting and self-sustaining organic 
system in a world hostile to life. In order to survive and prosper, individuals cooperate 
in the pursuit of one of four possible dynamic strategies – family multiplication 
(procreation and migration), conquest, commerce, technological change – so as to 
generate material prosperity by either accessing outside resources or extracting greater 
productivity from internal resources. This strategic pursuit causes the dominant  
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dynamic strategy to unfold, which in turn gives rise to a changing strategic (or 
dynamic) demand for a wide range of inputs of a material, institutional, ideational, 
and cultural kind. As the dominant dynamic strategy is progressively exploited and 
exhausted, society traverses a wave-like development path. And, at a deeper and 
global level, the resulting rise and fall of major societies drives an underlying process 
of technological paradigm transition, or economic revolution. This theory, therefore, 
shows how the dynamics of human society is generated and how this has shaped an 
exponential development path for technological paradigm change. It also shows why 
this theory, in contrast to orthodox economics, can handle the big and vital issues of 
climate change and the future of humanity. But most importantly, this theory makes it 
clear that a new economic revolution is imminent. 
In Chapter 5 — “Mitigation or Revolution? The Real Costs and Benefits” — 
the dynamic-strategy theory is employed to calculate greenhouse-gas concentrations 
together with the dynamic costs and benefits of both “business as usual” and the 
proposed climate-mitigation program over the course of the twenty-first century. It is 
shown that the real costs of climate mitigation grow exponentially during the twenty-
first century owing to the impact of this artificial program — this command system — 
in delaying the occurrence of the real Solar Revolution. Instead of being close to zero, 
these costs are actually close to 100 percent of world GDP by the year 2100. For the 
same reasons, greenhouse-gas emissions are shown to decline correspondingly 
rapidly. 
The essay concludes with a realist discussion of climate-change policy in 
Chapter 6 — “What’s to be done?” — which is expected to lead to increased human 
prosperity and security, together with an improvement in the world’s physical 
environment and climate. Essentially this essay is optimistic about the future of both 
human society and the natural environment, provided humanity’s usual commonsense 














The Challenge of Climate-Change Science 
Climate change is an endemic feature of the Earth’s natural history. Over at least the 
past 2,000 myrs there has emerged a regular pattern of long swings in climate — 
consisting of glacial periods of roughly 100,000 years, separated by warmer periods 
of around 10,000 years — caused by variations in both solar output and the Earth’s 
orbit. No one disputes this. What is in dispute is whether the climate change we are 
currently experiencing is unique — unique in terms of its abruptness, rate of change, 
and causes. 
Over the past couple of decades the scientific community — apart from a 
handful of diehard dissenters — has come to the conclusion that the rate of climate 
change is unprecedented, that the outcome will be highly dangerous to life on Earth, 
and that it has been caused largely by human activities, namely the burning of fossil 
fuels and large-scale deforestation. And, it is argued, because human agents have 
caused climate change since the late 1970s, we should be prepared to bear the cost of 
mitigating this dangerous development in the future. Indeed, unless we do so our 
planet, they claim, will become considerably less life friendly. 
THE CONVENTIONAL WISDOM 
There is an unprecedented degree of agreement within the international scientific 
community on this issue. The chief expressions of this scientific consensus are the  
regular massive reports commissioned by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change — the IPCC — that have appeared in 1990, 1996, 2001 and 2007. While the 
data have become more extensive and the models more sophisticated in this series of 
reports, the IPCC’s central conclusions have remained largely unchanged. These 
central conclusions are: 
•  since the Industrial Revolution, human activities — including the burning of 
fossil fuels and deforestation — have been largely responsible for the steadily 
growing concentration of greenhouse gases (such as carbon dioxide) in the 
atmosphere; 
•  this steadily growing concentration of greenhouse gases has accelerated in the 
past three decades; and 
•  this build-up of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere has been largely 
responsible for the increase in global temperatures by 0.56° to 0.94°C between 
1906 and 2005 (see Figure 2.1). 
These conclusions are considered to be “virtually certain” and “very likely”. 
[Fig 2.1 at end of essay] 
What is regarded by the IPCC as considerably less certain is how much global 
warming will occur in the future, how fast it will occur, and what impact it will have  
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on the environment and human society. The IPCC argues that the amount and speed 
of future climate change will depend upon the atmospheric concentrations of 
greenhouse gases and aerosols, the sensitivity of climate to these changing 
concentrations, changes in the internal circulation of the atmosphere and oceans, 
together with the impact of external influences in the form of variations in solar and 
volcanic activity. 
[Fig 2.2 at end of essay] 
Computer models, known as general circulation models, or GCMS, are 
employed by the IPCC to estimate climate outcomes on the basis of a range of 
assumptions made concerning changes in key social variables such as global 
population, technological change, energy use, and living standards. The schematic 
framework underlying these models is shown in Figure 2.2. Here is what the IPCC 
Mitigation report (2007: 182–83) says about the projection of social variables into the 
future: 
Population is often projected to grow along a pre-described 
(exogenous) path, while economic activity and emission intensities are 
projected based on differing assumptions from scenario to scenario. 
The economic growth path can be based on historical growth rates, 
convergence assumptions, or on fundamental growth factors, such as 
saving and investment behaviour, productivity changes, etc. Similarly, 
future emission intensities can be projected based on historical 
experience, economic factors, such as labour productivity or other key 
factors determining structural changes in an economy, or technological 
development. 
These assumptions arise from a range of “scenarios” suggested by the IPCC. While 
these simulation models are technically sophisticated, they are at heart just simplistic 
historicist models, in which future outcomes are merely variations on past outcomes. 
What we think will happen tomorrow is based on what we perceived as happening 
yesterday. This is hardly a very sophisticated model of the dynamics of human 
society. Of course, if we are only extrapolating the recent past into the future for just a 
few years, we won’t be too wrong; but if we do this for 100 to 200 years then our 
extrapolations will inevitably be wildly wrong owing to the power of compound 
interest and to the probable occurrence of a major structural change in human society. 
Just compare the world today with how it was around 1800, before the Industrial 
Revolution had taken hold. We return to this important issue in Chapter 5. 
On the basis of these unrealistic simulation models, the IPCC has made the 
following long-run projections to the year 2100 concerning greenhouse gases and 
aerosol concentrations: 
•  Carbon dioxide concentrations will increase in the range of 535 to 983 parts 
per million (ppm) by 2100 — concentrations 41 to 158 percent higher than 
current levels (see Figure 2.3).  
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•  Methane concentrations will increase in the range of 1.46 ppm to 3.39 ppm by 
2100 — 18 to 91 percent higher. 
•  Nitrous oxide will increase in the range of 0.36 to 0.46 ppm by 2100 — 11 to 
45 percent higher. 
[Figure 2.3 at end of essay] 
More recent work on emissions — the 2008 Garnaut Draft Report (ch. 4) — argues 
that the IPCC calculations are too conservative, and that greenhouse gases 
concentrations will increase even more rapidly. 
Feeding these emission projections into their computer models of climate 
change, the IPPC estimates that the Earth’s average surface temperature is likely to 
increase by 1.1°C to 6.4°C by 2100, relative to the base period of 1980 to 1990 (see 
Figures 2.4 and 2.5). Their best estimate is that temperatures will increase during the 
twenty-first century in the range 1.8°C to 4.0°C. In other words, it is expected that, on 
average, the rate of continental warming this century will be at least twice as large — 
possibly even four times as large — as that in the twentieth century. Some scientists, 
however, believe that the IPCC is being too conservative in its warming projections. 
In a 2005 article in Nature, a team of Oxford scientists have suggested that 
temperatures might even increase in the range 2°C to 11°C. Of course, the higher the 
rise in temperatures, the greater the cost of any adaptation and mitigation policies. 
[Figs 2.4 and 2.5 at end of essay] 
The anticipated increase in global warming during the twenty-first century is 
expected to lead to a significant rise in sea levels and to a growing occurrence and 
intensity of extreme weather events. In its 2007 Report the IPCC estimates that the 
global average sea level will rise by 18 to 59 cm, relative to the 1980 to 1999 level, 
depending on a range of “scenarios”. They argue that sea levels will rise with global 
warming owing to thermal expansion of ocean water, melting of glaciers and small ice 
caps, and reduction of the ice sheets of Greenland and Antarctica. But there is 
considerable uncertainty about some of these sources of sea-level rise. At the moment, 
scientific understanding of ice-sheet dynamics is insufficient to be able to determine 
the upper limit for sea-level increases with a high degree of certainty. If, for example, 
ice flow were to increase in a linear relationship to average global temperature, the 
upper range of projected sea rise could be 48 to 79 cm by 2100. And if the West 
Antarctic Ice Sheet were to break up and melt completely, global sea levels would rise 
by 5 to 6 meters; while the melting of the Greenland ice sheet would raise sea levels 
by a further 7 meters. The latter two events, however, are, with current knowledge, 
expected by the IPCC to take centuries and millennia respectively. Once again, the 
IPCC has taken a conservative approach; and there are some scientists who are 
willing to speculate that the ice sheets of Greenland and Western Antarctica could 
disappear by the end of the twenty-first century, adding 12 meters to current sea 
levels. Clearly this is not good news for the large populations (in the vicinity of 
hundreds of millions of people) living along coastal margins and in low-lying areas. 
Of course, as the IPCC fully appreciates, extremist claims will only lead the global 
community to abandon any attempt to seriously pursue climate mitigation.  
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Finally, global warming is expected to impact significantly on precipitation 
and storm intensity. The IPCC expects an increase in the amount and intensity of 
global precipitation. Climate models suggest that precipitation will increase on 
average throughout most of northern Europe, northeastern USA, Canada, the Arctic, 
tropical and eastern Africa, the northern Pacific, and Antarctica, as well as northern 
Asia and the Tibetan plateau in winter; and that it will decrease on average in most of 
the Mediterranean, northern Africa, northern Sahara, Central and southwestern 
America, the southern Andes, as well as southwestern Australia during winter. In 
other words, much of the increase in rainfall will take place over less populated parts 
of the world, whereas most of the reduction will occur in populated regions. Clearly 
this will impact on agricultural productivity. 
As far as storms are concerned, mid-latitude pathways are projected (by IPCC 
climate models) to shift towards the poles, with an increased intensity and reduced 
frequency. Tropical storms are expected to become more intense, to generate stronger 
peak winds, and to produce greater rainfall. At present the frequency of tropical 
storms is unclear. The overall impact will be towards greater destruction and the 
delivery of rainfall less frequently to less productive regions. Once again the global 
outlook for current forms of agriculture is less favorable. It is recognized, however, 
that some agricultural regions will initially benefit from modest global warming. 
A central theme in the conventional climate-change literature is an emphasis 
on the possibility of abrupt and unexpected changes in the physical environment — 
“surprises” as they are often called — as a result of global warming. Some dedicated 
mitigation engineers like to claim this will be the outcome of passing some hidden 
threshold level in carbon dioxide (CO2) — or carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2e) — 
some magical “tipping point” as the current fashionistas would have it. The usual 
suspects rounded up under this rubric include the following three effects. First, a 
possible breakdown in the current system of oceanic circulation that distributes heat 
around the globe. In particular, a reversal of the so-called Gulf stream “heat 
conveyor” would lead to a major cooling of Western Europe and eastern North 
America, and a corresponding warming of the lower latitudes. This we are told will 
have “disastrous” effects upon existing socioeconomic systems, even though the 
scientists telling us this are not experts in the responses of human systems. 
Second, as mentioned above, some scientists like to speculate that there is a 
threshold level of CO2 that will trigger a sudden breakup and melting of the ice sheets 
of Greenland and Antarctica, which would suddenly raise sea levels by 12 meters, 
affecting hundreds to thousands of millions of people. Third, unchecked global 
warming could lead, it is argued, to a sudden outbreak of “runaway carbon dynamics” 
— a process of rapid increases in carbon dioxide due to the action of positive 
feedbacks — leading to an acceleration of global warming. This, it is postulated, 
could occur because of the reversal of land-based carbon sinks in plants and soils, 
thawing of the permafrost, more frequent fires owing to global warming, and/or the 
release of methane stored in ice-like hydrate crystals found on the ocean floor. While 
there is only a small chance of these abrupt changes in physical systems occurring — 
particularly in some sort of domino sequence — their potentially great impact has 
caused some scientists to warn of their possible occurrence.  
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Which is fair enough. But one has the feeling that some enthusiastic mitigation 
engineers are determined to accumulate as many potential disasters as they can think 
of in order to improve the acceptance of their arguments. The disaster threshold 
argument has a particularly long history. It was employed, for example, by the “limits 
to growth” advocates in the 1970s to 1990s. These ecological engineers made the 
strong claim that unless economic growth was reduced to zero within a decade, 
human society would pass the point of no return and self-destruct. Needless to say it 
didn’t. 
At around the same time, James Lovelock (1990), of Gaia fame, made similar 
claims, and in his latest book The Revenge of Gaia (2006) he claims that it is now too 
late for action, as we have passed the point of no return, and Gaia will punish us for 
our transgressions against her by eliminating most of our species. Interestingly, 
Lovelock has always known that a natural crisis would overtake us. In the 1960s he 
believed, like a large number of other scientists — some (Bryson and Dittberner, 
1976) even claiming that carbon dioxide increases were reducing global temperatures 
— that it would be the result of the return of a long period of glaciation (a new ice 
age), which he viewed as the norm for our planet; but now he is convinced it will be a 
period of global “heating” (a term he prefers to “warming”) of our own making. 
Lovelock has angered many of his own tribe by preaching the virtues of nuclear 
power and the impotence of the low-carbon technologies beloved of the green 
movement. One wonders what crisis he (and other natural scientists) might nominate 
if temperatures decline again over the next few decades as some solar experts are now 
predicting. 
CLIMATE MITIGATION POLICIES 
The growing consensus in the science community is that even without these abrupt 
“surprises”, the modeled rate of global warming in the absence of large-scale 
corrective action is expected to be much greater than humanity can possibly cope with 
by adaptive action alone. Accordingly, large-scale government intervention — 
informed and advised by climate-change experts — in the form of climate mitigation 
policy is required if the present human and natural systems are to survive. This 
mitigation policy, we are told by the IPCC, should aim at reducing greenhouse-gas 
emissions by around 60 to 80 percent by 2100 — some, the zero emission enthusiasts, 
claim it should be even higher — in order to stabilize atmospheric concentrations of 
carbon dioxide equivalents in the range 450–55 ppm. Climatic stabilization requires, 
we are told, that total emissions be limited, some time in the not-too-distant future, to 
the level removed naturally by the atmosphere-shallow oceans-land-soil biota system. 
This must be effected, the IPCC insists, by reducing concentrations, by 
reforestation, and by artificial sequestration through pumping carbon dioxide into the 
earth and/or deep oceans or by stimulating increased biological activity in shallow 
oceans. The most technically feasible part of this mitigation program is emission 
reduction, which scientists believe could be achieved through increased energy 
efficiency, clean-coal technology, fuel substitution (particularly in motor vehicles), 
nuclear power, hydropower, solar energy (old not new paradigm), wind power, 
biomass energy, tidal wave energy, and geothermal energy. All these technologies, it 
should be noted, are part of the existing industrial technological paradigm rather than  
15 
 
the forthcoming technological revolution. The implications will be disused in 
Chapter 5. 
These currently uneconomic low-carbon technologies, which are seen by 
scientists as the core of the climate-mitigation program, will need to be promoted 
through government intervention (the favored instrument of the mitigation engineers) 
in the energy market by imposing either a carbon tax or a “cap and trade” system. 
This type of action is, of course, the province of the economist rather than the natural 
scientist and will be discussed further in Chapter 3. 
PROBLEMS WITH THE CONVENTIONAL WISDOM 
The basic climate-change science appears to be thorough and sound, and I have no 
intention of challenging it. The detailed analysis of recent changes in global 
emissions, green-house gas concentrations, temperatures, ice sheet melting, 
precipitation, and storm activity, together with the role played by humans, has been 
undertaken by some of the world’s most knowledgeable and capable natural scientists. 
It should be noted, however, that a number of reputable scientists — such as 
Dr Ken McCracken, former head of the CSIRO’s Division of Space Science, 
international expert in solar studies, and recipient of the prestigious Australia Prize — 
who regard themselves as part of the climate-change community, have argued that 
increased solar output has been responsible for at least part of the global warming 
detected over the past few decades. McCracken also claims that there will be a 
reduction in solar activity over the next two decades, which will reduce the impact of 
human-induced warming, and may even slightly reduce existing temperatures until at 
least the 2030s; but thereafter temperatures will increase again until the end of the 
century owing to renewed solar activity, thereby amplifying the impact of human-
induced climate change. The climate-change story, therefore, is not as simple as some 
of the more extreme mitigation engineers would have us believe. And this greater 
complexity may make it more difficult for them to sell their dreams of large-scale 
intervention in human society. 
While the climate-change science is sound, both the significance attached to 
recent climate change and the predictions made about future climate change and its 
likely impact on human society and other living systems, is wide of the mark. Even 
the world’s best natural scientists are out of their depth when analyzing the way 
human systems respond to the physical world. They have no expertise whatsoever in 
the critically important field of the dynamics of human society. 
I will argue, first, that climate-change scientists have drawn the wrong 
conclusions about the impact of past climate change on human society and, second, 
that, without a general dynamic theory of human systems, they are incapable of 
correctly estimating the nature and extent of any future human-induced climate 
change. In short, the IPCC’s estimates of carbon dioxide concentrations throughout 
the twenty-first century are hopelessly wrong; while those claiming higher 
concentrations are even more so. Ironically, by insisting that recent climate change is 
human induced, climate-change scientists have disqualified their entire profession 
from being taken seriously as expert commentators on future climate change. This has  
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opened the door for orthodox economists — an opening they too have failed to 
negotiate satisfactorily, as shown in Chapter 3. 
Drawing the wrong conclusions from history 
Consider the conclusions drawn by natural scientists concerning the impact of past 
climate change on human society. They are quite aware of the existence of abrupt and 
very rapid climate change during the 150,000-year history of modern man. According 
to evidence contained in ice cores taken from central Greenland, there have been 
twenty-four occurrences of abrupt and very rapid periods of climate change in the last 
100,000 years. These periods were typically characterized by gradual cooling from a 
warm interglacial period, followed by more abrupt cooling, then a cold interval and, 
finally, an abrupt and rapid warming of around 10°C in only a decade. 
These abrupt and rapid warmings have been called Dansgaard/Oeschger 
events. The most recent of these is know as the Younger Dryas event, which occurred 
about 12,800 years ago. This event consisted of a sudden interruption of a gradual 
warming following the last glaciation. It was a sudden return to a colder climate that 
lasted for about 1,200 years, and it was followed by a phase of abrupt and very rapid 
warming of 8°C in a decade, thereby ushering in the type of climate we enjoy today. 
Hence, the society of modern man has repeatedly experienced a large number of 
abrupt, rapid, and large-scale climate changes in the period since its first emergence 
some 150,000 years ago. 
What significance have natural scientists drawn from these regular episodes of 
climate change? Interestingly, these events are either ignored or down-played. For 
example, attention is diverted from these episodes of climate change by focusing on 
the undoubted fact that none of them coincided with the phase of civilization in 
human history. Some argue that while hunter-gatherers were able to successfully 
negotiate rapid climate change, civilized society — even modern technologically 
based society — will be unable to do so. The reason, they claim, is that while 
“prehistoric” societies were small and able to move into more climatically suitable 
regions, modern societies cannot replicate this response. 
This argument neglects a number of critically important matters, which 
reflects the lack of expertise of natural scientists in the dynamics of human society. 
One of these matters is that early human societies expanded quite quickly to fully 
occupy all available land given their paleolithic technological base. In other words, 
paleolithic societies fully occupied the globe with their available hunting/gathering 
technology and, hence, experienced problems similar to those expected of modern 
societies in the future – namely that there is no unoccupied land for the climatically 
dispossessed to inhabit. Further, if we temporarily accept the argument that abrupt 
climate change is dangerous to human society, we would need to acknowledge that 
Paleolithic societies were more at risk as their populations were small and, in the early 
years, mankind could have been completely wiped out. Finally, it should be clear that 
modern technology provides a flexibility of response about which early man could not 
have even dreamed.  
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The obvious point, therefore, is that if paleolithic society could prosper and 
generate the Neolithic Revolution despite experiencing twenty-four episodes of abrupt 
and very rapid climate change, surely modern man with his mastery over science and 
technology will be even more successful in this respect. The important implication 
here is that there is something about the human life-system that enables it to survive 
and prosper in the face of changes in the natural environment and in climate. But, by 
dismissing the experience of paleolithic societies and by focusing exclusively on the 
last 10,000 years, natural scientists are able to pretend that the severity of the current 
episode of climate change is unprecedented and uniquely dangerous. 
During the past 10,000 years there have been, of course, considerable 
fluctuations in climate, albeit not of the same magnitude as in earlier times. In Europe, 
for example, a warm period occurred between 1000 and 1270 AD, followed by the 
Little Ice Age from 1270 to 1850. These changes in climate would have influenced 
the pattern of economic activities but they had no significant impact on the 
transformation of a relatively backward part of the world into the global industrial 
powerhouse it had become by the middle of the nineteenth century. I have analyzed 
this transition, using my dynamic-strategy theory in The Ephemeral Civilization 
(1997). This analysis also exposes the fatal flaws in the attempts by some 
environmentalists to explain the rise and fall of societies in terms of changes in 
climate. 
The climate mitigationists only draw attention to earlier episodes of climate 
change to make the point that the present fairly stable situation could easily be 
transformed suddenly into one that is totally out of control. One prominent climate-
change scientist — Barry Pittock in Climate Change (2006: 40) — claims: 
Despite only gradual changes in driving forces, these observed rapid 
climate changes [in the past] appear to have occurred because the 
drivers reached some sort of tipping point or threshold at which 
climate flips into a new state. Such mechanisms suggest that similar 
rapid climate changes could happen again, even when driven by only 
gradual increases in greenhouse gases. 
The concept of “tipping points” or “critical thresholds” — which are not explored 
either theoretically or empirically — is employed by Pittock and others to fill the void 
left by the absence of a satisfactory general dynamic theory of climate change. It is all 
a matter of intellectual smoke and mirrors, which has no scientific basis. 
The real lesson to be derived from the pattern of repeated abrupt and rapid 
climate change during the history of modern humans has been totally ignored by 
natural scientists. The real lesson is that the human life-system, which enables us to 
survive and prosper in a hostile world, has been shaped in part by the regular 
occurrence of abrupt and rapid climate change. Modern man, in other words, is part 
of a dynamic life-system that is able not only to survive climate change, but also to 
prosper in the face of its fiercest onslaughts. As I have shown elsewhere (Snooks, 
1996; 1997; 1998a; 2003), the human life-system has been able to grow at an 
exponential rate — as described by the Snooks-Panov algorithm — over the past 
150,000 years, despite living in a hostile environment. In effect, the dynamic process  
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of human society has not missed a beat throughout this long period of time. This is the 
lesson that natural scientists have ignored — the good news that the mitigation 
engineers don’t want to hear. In Chapter 5 I show that there are good theoretical and 
empirical reasons for concluding that our dynamic life-system will enable us to 
continue to survive and prosper in the face of the current climate-change event. 
Employing the wrong models 
Consider the range of carbon dioxide concentrations and temperatures projected by 
the IPCC’s models. While not wanting to challenge the climate science about the 
relationship between fossil-fuel emissions and global temperatures, I totally reject the 
models used to estimate future emissions. Once again the problem faced by the IPCC 
is their failure to construct a realist general dynamic theory of human society. Because 
of this failure, they are unable to model the technological development path of human 
society, and have totally overlooked the forthcoming technological paradigm shift — 
the fourth economic revolution in human history. Instead they employ naive 
historicist models that merely extrapolate into the future key economic variables 
(population, living standards, energy use, etc) on a range of different, but inadequate, 
assumptions based on recent experience. As shown in Chapter 5, my dynamic-
strategy theory — a realist general dynamic theory — is able to model the underlying 
exponential technological development path and, thereby, is able to predict the next 
technological revolution — the real Solar Revolution — beginning in the middle 
decades of this century. This major discovery renders all IPCC emission scenarios and 
estimates — together with the temperature estimates based on them — totally 
redundant. Accordingly, the recent lobbying of governments by natural scientists on 
the issue of climate mitigation is no more than empty posturing, as they just don’t 
possess the necessary expertise. Before outlining the new science of societal dynamics 
– the only valid basis for government policy concerning future climate change – we 












The Limitations of Orthodox Economics 
The door leading economists into the climate-change debate was opened by natural 
scientists insisting that recent climate change is human induced. As orthodox, or 
neoclassical, economics is largely based on the microeconomic analysis of prices and 
the costs and benefits of investment expenditures, it was inevitable that its 
practitioners attempt to economically evaluate alternative policies of climate 
mitigation. The question tackled in this chapter is: What are the costs and benefits of 
the contribution of orthodox economics to the climate-change debate? And the answer 
is that the costs greatly, dangerously, exceed the benefits. 
THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 
Because the current phase of climate change is said to be human induced, orthodox 
economists have been able to hijack the policy debate, leaving natural scientists out in 
the cold. Neoclassical economists believe they have the rational answer to every 
policy decision involving resources, expenditures, prices, taxes and profits, no matter 
how large the problem or how long its duration. As one of the major participants in 
the policy debate, Nicholas Stern, author of the recent Stern Review (2007: 319) on 
the economics of climate change, has written: 
Science reveals the nature of the danger and provides the foundations 
for the technologies that can enable the world to avoid them. 
Economics offers a framework that can help policymakers decide how 
much action to take and with what policy instruments. It can also help 
people understand the issues and form views about both the 
appropriate behaviour and policies. The scientific and economic 
framework provides a structure for the discussions necessary to get to 
grips with the global challenge and guidance in setting rational and 
consistent national and international policies. 
While most orthodox economists believe they have the theoretical tools and 
statistical techniques to engage successfully with the central issues and policies 
concerning climate, it is the development economists who feel most comfortable 
advocating the massive degree of government intervention involved in climate 
mitigation. Why? Because development economists have become accustomed to 
urging large-scale government intervention in the less-developed world to promote 
economic development. And they have become experts in justifying large-scale 
intervention on the grounds of both “market failure” and “ethics”. As the subtitle of 
one his recent books suggests, Nicholas Stern’s (2005) concern is with “Making 
Development Happen”, presumably because he believes it cannot happen without him 
and his colleagues. Even though economic development is as old as human society, 
the “development industry” has existed only since the mid-twentieth century: and yet 
development economists like Nicholas Stern believe that their discipline is essential to  
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the economic rise of the lesser-developed world! This argument is presented more 
fully in my book Global Transition (Snooks 1999). 
It is not a very large step for these professional interventionists to take from 
the arena of economic development to that of climate mitigation — from the lesser-
developed world to the entire global community. Not all economists, however, feel 
comfortable with the degree of intervention being advocated by the mitigation 
engineers. Many economists believe in the sanctity of free marks and need to be 
convinced that a market has failed systematically before they are willing to sanction 
large-scale government intervention. This is why mitigation engineers like Nicholas 
Stern place so much emphasis on “market failure”. 
IS ECONOMICS UP TO THE TASK? 
Orthodox economists are completely confident that their theory of capitalist 
production is more than capable of analyzing all societal issues. I will argue, however, 
that the ability of neoclassical economics to analyze reality is severely limited. How 
confident can we be in a science that employs as its model of human society the 
hypothetical “firm”? 
The nature of modern economics 
Neoclassical economics emerged from the “marginal revolution” of the 1870s, which 
was pioneered by W.S. Jevons (1835–1882) in England, Carl Menger (1840–1921) in 
Austria, and Léon Walras (1834–1910) in Lausanne. This mathematically based 
“theory of value” or “theory of the firm”, which was elegantly summarized by Alfred 
Marshall (1842–1924), is concerned with small (or marginal) changes in markets in 
the short-term within a comparative static (rather than a dynamic) framework. The 
theory of the firm, which is preoccupied with conditions of equilibrium (rather than 
the disequilibrium of dynamics), reflects the nineteenth-century influence of classical 
thermodynamics. This mechanical physics-like approach to human society displaced 
the earlier, more organic science of classical economics – pioneered by the French 
Physiocrats and Adam Smith (1723–1790) in the eighteenth century, and Karl Marx 
(1818-1883) in the nineteenth century – which focused on longer-run dynamic 
processes underlying the transformation of human society. These issues are discussed 
in greater detail in my book Economics Without Time (1993). Since the late nineteenth 
century, orthodox economics has been largely concerned with everyday economic 
issues examined within a short-run, static framework. As the Cambridge Post-
Keynesian economist Joan Robinson famously said, neoclassical economics is 
trivially concerned with “the price of a cup of tea”. 
The theoretical tools that orthodox economists bring to the table when 
discussing climate change — anything but a trivial or static issue — include: cost–
benefit analysis, price theory, the shadowy theory of external diseconomies 
(somewhat loosely called “externalities”), and market failure. These somewhat 
meager tools of microeconomics are expected to handle the big macro issues of the 
dynamics of human society and its interaction with climate change throughout the 
next century or so. This is like turning up to the gunfight at OK Corral with a Swiss  
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Army knife — a very effective tool for small jobs but completely outgunned in the 
world of realist dynamics. 
It is hardly surprising that neoclassical economics has failed to develop a 
realist theory of dynamics. Its misnamed “growth theory” is not growth theory at all, 
as it focuses merely on convergence to equilibrium in the tradition of classical 
thermodynamics mentioned above. Economics failed to follow the lead of physics in 
the twentieth century when a reformulated thermodynamics shifted its focus to far-
from-equilibrium conditions. As neoclassical growth theory has little to say about 
real-world dynamics, it is not even invoked by climate-change economists. 
To his credit, Nicholas Stern is aware of some of the deficiencies in 
neoclassical economics. As a development economist he certainly should be. He tells 
us, for example, that: 
Standard externality and cost-benefit approaches have their usefulness 
for analysing climate change, but, as they are methods focused on 
evaluating marginal changes, and generally abstract from dynamics 
and risk, they can only be starting points for further work … 
Standard treatments of discounting are valuable for analysing marginal 
projects but are inappropriate for non-marginal comparisons of 
[development] paths; the approach to discounting must meet the 
challenge of assessing and comparing paths that have very different 
trajectories and involve very long-term and large inter-generational 
impacts. (Stern 2007: 25) 
But, as an orthodox economist, Stern’s dilemma is that he has no other theoretical 
instruments to substitute for these static, short-term, marginal concepts. So, despite 
his qualifications, Stern is forced to resort to these inadequate theoretical instruments 
anyway. And by employing totally inappropriate tools of analysis, Stern and the rest 
of his tribe have contributed to “the great climate-mitigation delusion”. As the 
mitigation engineers have failed to understand the dynamics of human society, they 
are unable to analyze the future either of human society or the planet. It is like placing 
a teashop proprietor in charge of the future of humanity. 
Unfortunately most orthodox economists are just not aware of the full extent 
of the limitations of their profession. Why? Because these theoretically trained 
economists rarely encounter big issues in the real world; and, if they do, they skate 
across the deficiencies of their methods with heroic boldness. Whenever static costs 
exceed static benefits, which is often the case with big real-world issues, orthodox 
economists usually suggest that the participants must be economically irrational, or 
driven by non-material motivations. 
The failure of economics to explain reality 
The deficiencies of neoclassical economics are glaringly obvious when applied to big 
historical events, as has been done quite innocently by the so-called New Economic 
Historians — neoclassical economists who turned their attention to history,  
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particularly in the USA from the 1960s. A few examples — including US railroads, 
the American War of Independence, the US Civil War, and the economic pay-off of 
the British empire — will help to illustrate my argument about the limited ability of 
economics when examining big, real-world issues. In order not to obscure our main 
argument, these historical examples will be dealt with briefly. Interested readers may 
wish to consult my other books where they are developed in more detail. 
In the celebrated case of the economic role of US railroads, the historical 
economist Robert Fogel (1964) employed neoclassical theory to measure the static 
costs and benefits of American investment in transport technology. He estimated the 
“social saving” from railroad investment to have been only about 4 percent of GNP in 
1890 (which was much less than other economic activities) and concluded, therefore, 
that railroads played only a limited role in American economic development. 
According to Fogel — later jointly (with Douglass North) awarded the Nobel Prize in 
Economics for his promotion of neoclassical theory in history — railroads were not 
essential to American growth in the second half of the nineteenth century, and that 
their role could have been performed largely by existing river and canal systems. 
What his neoclassical analysis completely overlooks are the dynamic benefits of 
creating, in response to strategic demand, an integrated mega-market in the second 
half of the nineteenth century that was to facilitate the unfolding of the USA’s 
technological strategy ––an unfolding process that enabled the USA to achieve world 
economic dominance in the twentieth century. As I show in The Ephemeral 
Civilization (1997: 374–76), railway construction was not economically marginal but 
rather was central to this development. 
In the case of the American War of Independence, neoclassically inspired 
economic historians have attempted to measure the static costs and benefits to the 
American colonialists of British imperialism. To do this they have estimated the 
annual costs of “distortions of trade routes” resulting from the Navigation Acts 
imposed by Britain between 1763 and 1775. Traditionally, these costs, which have 
been regarded as the main burden of empire, amounted to no more than 3 percent of 
gross colonial product. As such they would have been largely offset by benefits from 
being part of the British empire, which included British subsidies, bounties, and 
military protection. Others have argued that the costs of taxes and customs imposed 
by Britain after the war with France, together with the restrictions resulting from the 
1763 Proclamation Line (defining the western boundary of the colonies) were not 
terribly onerous. The conclusion? That politics rather than economics explains the 
very costly and risky fight by the Americans for independence, when they had so little 
to gain economically. It was a long and costly war that was only won after French 
involvement. Yet why would the Americans risk so much for political ends? The real 
answer is that the neoclassical evaluation of the static costs of empire do not come 
close to approximating the dynamic costs. As we shall see in Chapter 5, the same is 
true of the static costs of climate mitigation. The struggle for independence was a 
fight for control of very different dynamic strategies. The British were pursuing a 
global commerce strategy and wanted, as a maritime power, to confine American 
settlement to the eastern seaboard; whereas the colonialists were pursing the family-
multiplication strategy and wanted, as a potential continental power, to expand 
westward. It was a clash of dynamic strategies, and the costs of being dominated by  
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the British can be measured in terms of the huge potential gains that could be made by 
forging a mega-market across North America. To convert these potential costs into 
realized benefits was why the Americans were prepared to risk so much. There are, of 
course, lessons to be learnt here for the potential clash in the twenty-first century 
between the antistrategic mitigation engineers and the global strategists. It could 
become a clash of dynamic strategies on a far more massive scale than that of the War 
of Independence. And it would be far more costly. 
When considering the static costs and benefits of the American Civil War 
(1861–1865), Robert Fogel (1989) is led by his neoclassical training to argue that as 
the cost of this internecine conflict — including the deaths of 600,000 men and the 
destruction of much infrastructure — outweighed the apparent benefits, the war must 
have been fought over the moral issue of slavery. This is a very odd conclusion, as my 
study of human history suggests that men in massive numbers do not surrendor their 
lives for moral issues. And, in fact, when we take the dynamic benefits into account, 
as in The Ephemeral Civilization (1997: 378–84), it is clear that the US Civil War was 
a clash between two every different dynamic strategies. The North was desperate to 
maintain the political integrity of the USA in order to develop a mega-market under 
tariff protection, which would drive its burgeoning technological strategy based on its 
industrial facilities in the north-east. In contrast, the South was equally desperate to 
achieve independence from the protectionist North in order to pursue its free-trade 
commerce strategy based on the export of plantation crops, particularly cotton, to 
Britain in exchange for cheap industrial products. The potential dynamic benefits to 
both camps arising from the success of their strategic goals were huge, and greatly in 
excess of the high costs of this long, drawn-out, and expensive war. The victory of the 
North led to the transformation of the USA into the world’s largest and most 
prosperous society in the twentieth century, although at the cost of a depressed South. 
This global dominance would not have occurred in a politically and, hence, 
economically fragmented North America. 
Finally, consider the economic basis for the British empire after 1885. Some 
have argued — as outlined in The Ephemeral Civilization (Snooks 1997: 2929–300) 
— that after 1885, the return on investment in empire was significantly lower than 
that at home or abroad; that the real beneficiaries of empire were the 
colonials/dominionists; that those in the UK who benefited most were the aristocrats 
at the expense of the tax-paying middle classes; and that between 1870 and 1913, the 
static gains were only 1 to 6 percent of GNP, compared with 10 percent on railways. 
Hence, the post-1885 empire is seen by neoclassically inspired historians as 
economically irrational and anachronistic. Once again, however, the dynamic benefits 
have been ignored. The major dynamic benefit of empire, which accrued to UK’s tax-
paying middle classes, was the role it played in defending and enhancing Britain’s 
dynamic strategy of technological change, which generated high rates of continuous 
economic growth. Empire guaranteed Britain’s post-1885 survival and security. I 
argue that empire was only abandoned when Britain found a more economical method 
of defending its technological strategy at home — the atomic bomb. As soon as the 
bomb was developed, Britain dismantled its empire and emerged richer than ever.  
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In all these historical case studies, the costs are easily measured in a static 
framework, but not so the most important benefits that are always dynamic in nature. 
As we will see in detail in Chapter 5, the same is true when neoclassical economics is 
applied to climate change. As always, the dynamic benefits of the strategic pursuit are 
completely neglected. Also neoclassical economists fail to understand the mutual 
destruction that always arises from the clash of opposing dynamic strategies. The 
bottom line is that orthodox economics is a totally unsuitable discipline for dealing 
with the big dynamic issues in human society — particularly the big issue of climate 
change. 
WHAT ABOUT THE MODELS EMPLOYED? 
Because orthodox economics has failed to construct a general dynamic theory of 
human society, it is forced to fall back on naive historicist models when estimating 
the impact of either climate change or proposed mitigation policies. There is a major 
irony here. Orthodox economists pride themselves on their superior deductive 
approach to constructing economic theory and are largely contemptuous of the work 
of historical economists who employ inductive techniques. While they continue to 
focus on problems of “the-price-of-a-cup-of-tea” variety — of short-term, static and 
marginal (trivial) issues –– they can maintain their self-delusion. But when they take 
on long-term, dynamic, and non-marginal (important) issues they find themselves 
completely out of their depth. Of course, it usually takes someone else to point it out. 
If neoclassical economists insist on exploring the big issues like climate 
change, their only option — like that of the IPCC — is to employ the historicist 
models that historical economists reject as being simplistic and, therefore, dangerous. 
These historicist models involve extrapolating key economic variables into the future 
on the basis of a range of arbitrary assumptions. The technical sophistication of these 
models — which may seem impressive to the uninitiated — doesn’t alter the fact that 
they fail to capture the dynamics of human society. They have, in other words, no way 
of taking into account any major structural changes that might occur as a result of the 
internal dynamics of human society. Ironically, only the inductively based theory of 
the historical economist is able to achieve this essential requirement. 
The historicist models employed in the Stern Report are called “integrated 
assessment models” (or IAMs). These IAMs include a range of sectors, such as 
agriculture, forestry, fisheries, water systems, energy supplies, ecosystems, coastal 
zones and so on. Stern (2007: 164) claims that: “IAMs simulate the process of human-
induced climate change, from emissions of GHGs [greenhouse gases] to the socio-
economic impacts of climate change”. The modeled chain of impacts — which also 
includes feedback effects — operates from population, technology, production and 
consumption to emissions to atmospheric concentrations to “radiative forcing” and 
global climate to regional climate and weather to direct impacts (crops, forests and 
ecosystems) to socioeconomic impacts. 
The IAMs are employed to make calculations of impacts on climate, 
environment, and human society for periods of up to 200 years into the future. All 
without considering the probability of major structural change over this long period of 
time. Of course, if we go 200 years or so back into the past, we enter a very different  
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(pre-industrial) world to that existing today. Imagine the impact that the structural 
change called the Industrial Revolution would have had on the credibility of any 
historicist models (using similarly unrealistic or ephemeral assumptions) that might 
have been estimated in the late eighteenth century for the following 200 years! It does 
not seem to have occurred to the neoclassical authors of these models that their 
projections will be just as wildly inaccurate. 
WHAT IS THE ECONOMISTS’ STORY? 
It is a simple story. Using the textbook theory of the firm, the Stern Report attempts to 
calculate the costs of “business as usual” pursued in the face of hypothetical climate 
change over the next two centuries, compared with the costs of “stabilizing” climate 
change (by preventing any further increase in greenhouse gas concentrations) over the 
same time period. Of course, they employ estimates of emissions, concentrations, and 
temperature change generated by their unrealistic historicist IAMs. Stern (2007: xv) 
summarizes his simple analysis and calculations as follows: 
Using the results from formal economic models, the Review estimates 
that if we don’t act, the overall costs and risk of climate change will be 
equivalent to losing at least 5% of global GDP each year now and 
forever. If a wider range of risks and impacts is taken into account, the 
estimates of damage could rise to 20% of GDP or more. 
In contrast, the costs of action — reducing greenhouse emissions to 
avoid the worst impacts of climate change — can be limited to around 
1% of global GDP each year 
On the basis of these simple calculations, the rational course of action, 
according to the orthodox economist seems clear: a climate-mitigation program will, 
in the long run, be less costly than “business as usual”. The cost of mitigation is 
portrayed as being quite modest and manageable — merely 1% of GDP or $1 in every 
$100 we produce. A reasonable insurance policy? Actually it is not quite as 
reasonable as it looks, as it is about ten times the rate we would expect to pay on our 
house insurance, but I suppose a habitable planet is more important to us than our 
individual houses. 
Actually, the scale of the intervention being proposed through climate 
mitigation can only be fully appreciated by looking at it in absolute terms. One 
percent of world GDP, which currently (2007) amounts to $656.1 billion, is a very 
large figure — more than the USA spends on its military program (about $560 billion) 
each year. And this would be required in each and every year forever. Another way of 
looking at this matter is to estimate the amount of cumulative investment and 
employment that would be required by 2050 in low-carbon technologies as part of this 
mitigation program. Stern (2007: 304) tells us that the cumulative investment required 
will amount to US$13 trillion — that is 13 followed by twelve zeros! — and the 
number of workers required would be 25 million — more than the entire population 
of Australia. Clearly, this is intervention on a massive scale.  
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THE JUSTIFICATION FOR MASSIVE INTERVENTION 
Intervention on this global scale is difficult for neoclassical economists to justify. The 
theory of the firm is based on the key idea that the best — that is the most efficient — 
outcomes are experienced when markets are allowed to operate with minimal 
interference. The only way neoclassical economists can rationalize significant 
intervention is when the market system has failed. Normally, “market failure” is 
invoked to justify occasional small-scale interventions, otherwise intervention, rather 
than freely operating markets, becomes the rule rather than the exception. Which 
makes nonsense of a market-based economics. A major market imperfection is what 
economists call external diseconomies (referred to rather loosely by Stern as 
“externalities”), which arise when the action of one producer causes costs for other 
producers — costs that the offending producer does not have to bear himself — such 
as downstream pollution of water or air. It should be realized that the concept of 
external economies is a shadowy one, particularly when it is extended from producers 
to the entire global society. Tibor Scitovsky (1954), one of the pioneers of this 
economic concept, wrote: “The concept of external economies is one of the most 
illusive in economic literature”. As I show later, it is also an artificial concept that 
owes its existence to the myopic focus of neoclassical economics on a small subset — 
the producer — of the wider human life-system. 
Because of the massive scale of intervention required to stabilize greenhouse-
gas concentrations, climate-change economists go into overdrive concerning “market 
failure”, “market imperfections”, “barriers” to “sustainable” and “ethical” outcomes, 
and to “externalities”. Stern, for example, is able to detect market imperfections in 
every nook and cranny (or should that be every crook and nanny?) in the global 
economy. He tells us, for example: 
In common with many other environmental problems, human-induced 
climate change is at its most basic level an externality. Those who 
produce greenhouse-gas emissions are bringing about climate change, 
thereby imposing costs on the world and on future generations, but 
they do not face directly, neither via markets nor in other ways, the full 
consequences of the costs of their actions … so they face little or no 
economic incentive to reduce emissions. Similarly, emitters do not 
have to compensate those who lose out because of climate change. In 
this sense, human-induced climate change is an externality, one that is 
not ‘corrected’ through any institution or market, unless policy 
intervenes … All in all, it [climate change] must be regarded as market 
failure on the greatest scale the world has seen. (Stern 2007: 27) 
In addition to the idea that climate change is market failure “on the greatest 
scale the world has seen”, Sterns finds “barriers” to rational behavior and motivation 
together with “market imperfections” everywhere in modern society. To his mind this 
justifies not only a carbon tax that will force carbon emitters to mend their ways, but 
also a whole network of government interventions in the form of support for 
uncompetitive low-carbon technologies, regulations, information disclosure, and 
“persuasion”, as well as direct investment by the public sector in energy conservation.  
27 
 
THE GOALS AND INSTRUMENTS OF INTERVENTION 
The mitigation engineers believe, therefore, that owing to systemic market failure, 
even in the most progressive societies, it is the responsibility of governments, advised 
by right-minded experts, to establish the goals, incentives and rules to save us from 
ourselves. The private sector’s role in this agenda is to respond passively to the 
directions of the mitigation engineers rather than creatively to the requirements of the 
dynamic process underlying their life-system. What the mitigation engineers are 
proposing is the establishment of a series of command economies at both the national 
and international levels. In this section we will review the way in which this is to be 
done. 
The Stern Review advocates a tripartite mitigation policy to stabilize 
greenhouse gas concentrations in the range 450–550 ppm in carbon dioxide 
equivalents (CO2e). First, it is necessary, we are told, to establish an “appropriate” 
price for carbon through government imposition of taxes, trading, or regulation. While 
this will redirect the costs of climate change back to the carbon producers, thereby 
providing them with “incentives” to modify their activities, this manipulation of 
energy prices will not be sufficient. Stern is adamant that owing to “a range of other 
market failures and barriers … carbon pricing alone is not sufficient”. Secondly, 
therefore, he and his colleagues claim that “technology policy … is vital to bring 
forward the range of low-carbon and high efficiency technologies that will be needed 
to make deep emissions cuts”. This will involve R&D, demonstration, and market-
support policies to “help drive innovation, and motivate a response by the private 
sector”. Thirdly, Stern insists that “policies to remove the barriers to behavioural 
change … policies on regulation, information and financing … and a shared 
understanding of the nature of climate change and its consequences, should be 
fostered through evidence, education, persuasion and discussion” (Stern 2007: 349; 
my emphasis). 
Hence, it is not enough for governments to restructure the ordinary market 
mechanism. It is also considered necessary to “drive” innovation, “motivate” 
strategists, and to change the thinking and behavior of all citizens through “education” 
and “persuasion”. Can there be any doubt that the mitigation engineers want to 
transform out free-enterprise societies into command societies in which they set the 
goals and ensure they are achieved by a very wide range of instruments of 
intervention? All in the name of saving us from ourselves. What, one wonders, will be 
necessary in the world envisaged by the mitigation engineers if and when the measure 
of government “education and persuasion” fail? Coercion? 
Of particular interest here is Stern’s view of market intervention and control. 
He calls it “harnessing markets for mitigation” — riding markets like horses! The 
theory used to justify this unprecedented degree of intervention in democratic 
societies is textbook short-run, static price theory, showing the likely impact of taxes 
on prices and output — theory concerning “the price of a cup of tea”. To his credit, 
Stern is aware of some of the limitations involved in employing a short-term policy 
framework to deal with long-term issues of global significance. “The challenge”, he 
writes, “is how to ensure that the short-term policy framework remains on track to 
deliver the long-term stabilisation goal” (Stern 2007: 359). His response to this  
28 
 
challenge is to argue that policy instruments — such as a carbon tax — should be 
employed in a flexible way to continually keep society in the vicinity of its 
“stabilisation target”. Stern (2007: 360) tells us: 
The stabilisation target is analogous to the inflation target. In the UK, 
the Monetary Policy Committee each month sets a short-term policy 
instrument, the interest rate on central bank money, until their next 
meeting, in order to keep inflation on track to hit its target. The 
analogy with climate-change policy would be the setting of a tax rate 
or an emissions trading quote for, say, a five year period, with firms 
and households making their own decisions about emissions reductions 
subject to that carbon-price path and their expectations about policy-
makers’ committment to the long-term stabilisation goal. 
This is fascinating. Stern actually links stabilization targeting with inflation 
targeting! Fascinating because for the past decade or so, I have been making the point 
that inflation targeting is a policy instrument that is damaging the dynamic 
mechanism of the human life-system, which will have a detrimental impact on our 
material progress (Snooks 1997b; 1998b; 2008b; 2008c). That damage is now (late 
2008-early 2009) evident in the emerging global problems of slower (even negative) 
growth and increasing unemployment. If an analogy is to be drawn from inflation 
targeting, it is that stabilization targeting will also inflict damage on the underlying 
dynamic mechanism, albeit in a different way. This is discussed below. 
But stabilization targeting is, according to the Stern Review, not sufficient, 
even in developed countries, to motivate business people and consumers to meet their 
mitigation goal. The reason, as usual, is that capitalist society is riddled with market 
failure. It is necessary, therefore, to employ a wide variety of additional instruments 
of intervention in order to transform our industrial society into a low-carbon society. 
The first barrage of instruments of intervention are necessary, Stern tells us, to 
accelerate the adoption of low-carbon technologies that otherwise would remain 
uncompetitive. These are referred to as “deployment policies”. Stern (2007: 421) 
claims that “deployment policies encourage the private sector to develop and deploy 
low-carbon technologies”. The deployment policies are wide-ranging and include 
fiscal incentives, capital grants, “feed-in” tariffs, quotas, subsidies and skewed 
procurement policies by public monopolies and local and national governments. In 
other words: “protection all round”. Governments are also encouraged to fine-tune 
their intellectual property regimes and to judiciously employ planning and licensing 
regulations to smooth the path for companies employing low-carbon technologies. 
But even this degree of intervention is insufficient to implement the goals of 
the mitigation engineers. Stern (2007: 427) explains: 
Policies to price greenhouse gas, and support technology development, 
are fundamental to tackle climate change. However, even if these 
measures are taken, barriers and market imperfections may still inhibit 
action, particularly on energy efficiency. These barriers and failures 
include hidden and transaction costs such as the cost of the time  
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needed to plan new investments; lack of information about available 
options; capital constraints; misaligned incentives; as well as 
behavioural and organisational factors affecting economic rationality 
in decision-making. These market imperfections result in significant 
obstacles to the uptake of cost-effective mitigation, and weakened 
drivers for innovation, particularly in markets for energy efficiency 
measures. 
Owing to all these alleged market failures and barriers, it is remarkable that human 
society has been able to get along without the mitigation engineers for so long — like 
150,000 years. 
The policy instruments suggested by the Stern Review to overcome these 
anticipated problems fall into the categories of regulation, information, and finance. 
Regulation, they believe, is required to communicate policy intentions; reduce 
uncertainty, complexity, and transaction costs; induce innovation; and, ironically, to 
avoid technological “lock-in”. This regulation, as I show in chapter 5, will actually 
contribute to locking the global economy into the old exhausted technological 
paradigm. Information policies on the other hand, are required to disseminate best-
practice ideas, and to “help consumers and firms make sounder decisions and 
stimulate more competitive markets for more energy efficient goods and services”. 
And financing policy should encourage private investment to raise energy efficiency, 
while direct government investment should focus on energy conservation. These 
suggestions, of course, are based on the very shaky assumption that the mitigation 
experts and their compliant government bureaucracies are better placed than 
consumers and “strategists” (or economic decision-makers) to understand where the 
best interests of human society lies. 
It is certainly clear from this very comprehensive network of instruments of 
intervention that Stern and his fellow mitigation engineers are encouraging 
governments to assume responsibility for the direction to be taken by human society 
in the future. While they claim that the response to centrally determined goals, 
incentives, regulations and directives is the responsibility of the private sector, it is 
also clear that it has been cast in a minor and passive role. The major and active role 
is to be played by governments, bureaucracies, and their climate-change advisors. 
The proposed global climate-mitigation program is a major and unprecedented 
experiment in reshaping and redirecting human society on both a national and 
international scale. In modern history, the closest approach to this type of societal 
experiment was the command economy of the USSR in the twentieth century. Both 
the “mitigation economy” and the USSR had their goals set not by strategists but by 
interventionist metaphysicians (by environmentalists or by Marxists, who are moved 
by faith rather than reality); both the mitigation economy and the USSR established a 
comprehensive network of metaphysically determined prices, rules, regulations, 
incentives, and technologies to manipulate consumer demand and to constrain the 
activities of firms (or “enterprises”). The main difference between these two heavily 
regulated systems are the greater freedom of prices and decision makers in the 
mitigation economy, which in economic terms is the least significant issue.  
30 
 
If you are able to centrally determine the goals and broad network of 
incentives, rules, regulations and technologies, you are able to take control of an 
economic system away from the strategists and place it in the hands of the 
interventionist metaphysicians. By doing so you turn a strategic society into an 
antistrategic society — a free enterprise economy into a command economy. Only 
strategic societies survive and prosper in the longer term because only strategists with 
a high degree of responsibility and freedom of action are able to respond, via strategic 
demand, to the requirements of their life-system. The interventionists respond instead 
to misleading metaphysical ideas, such as Marxism, neo-liberalism, or radical 
environmentalism. The proof of this argument can be found in the collapse of the 
USSR — a society hijacked by metaphysical interventionists — after only three 
generations. Goals, incentives and technologies must be established by freely 
operating markets if human society is to survive and prosper — they must be 
established according to strategic values and not metaphysical values. 
Interventionists fail not only in the big things, such as creating command 
economies like the USSR, but also in smaller things, like the various attempts to “fix” 
the so-called “global financial crisis” of the last quarter of 2008. Governments around 
the world, advised by metaphysical interventionists, attempted to rescue their 
financial institutions by injections of large quantities of tax-payers’ money, and by 
giving grandiose guarantees of total protection to bank deposits. The latter “solution” 
was chosen by the Australian Rudd government, despite the fact that the Australian 
banking system, in contrast to sections of that in the USA, was regarded as very sound 
at that time. The immediate and very predictable response by the public, was a major 
run on non-bank deposits held by financial institutions not covered by these 
guarantees, followed by the equally predictable reaction by affected financial 
institutions in freezing billions of dollars of these deposits. This led to a major, if 
temporary, distortion of markets and much personal distress. Hence, because the 
Australian government, and its economic advisors, had no understanding of the 
dynamics of their economy, instability was injected into an otherwise secure system. 
Similarly, the large-scale injection of funds into failing financial institutions around 
the world will distort the market mechanism of the dynamic life-system. Imagine, 
therefore, the economic problems that will be created by the massive intervention 
required to implement a serious climate mitigation program.  
The issue of who sets the goals and incentives transcends the usual discussion 
of the relative efficiency of the public and private sectors. But even at this level, Stern 
and his fellow mitigation engineers are hopelessly optimistic. They believe that 
government ministers and bureaucrats — guided by the mitigation “experts” — can 
improve the efficiency of the private sector. This, however, is clearly not the case, 
primarily because public servants are not directly exposed to the consequences of 
their decisions and actions in the way business people are. We are all familiar with the 
poor quality of real-world decision making of public servants in regulating the private 
sector and in operating government monopolies. It is unrealistic to expect public 
servants to devise and sustain efficient energy and production systems through the 
indirect means at their disposal, and totally bizarre to expect them to devise and 
sustain our dynamic life-system.  
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THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF ECONOMICS 
Owing to the failure of orthodox economics to develop a general dynamic theory of 
human society — a subject in which they have displayed not the slightest interest over 
the past 150 years — its story about climate mitigation and the future of humanity is 
not only pure fiction, it is also highly misleading and dangerous. While admitting 
their theoretical tools have certain limitations, orthodox economists have not told the 
complete truth. The complete truth is that while they have something to say about 
small, short-term issues that can be handled in a static framework, they have nothing 
to say about big, long-term issues that can only be dealt with dynamically. While they 
can isolate forces determining “the price of a cup of tea”, orthodox economists are 
unable to model the underlying dynamic forces that will determine the changing 
nature not only of civilization but also of the Earth’s climate as the twenty-first 
century unfolds. 
By analyzing the costs and benefits of a proposed comprehensive mitigation 
program in a static rather than a dynamic framework, orthodox economists have 
provided an entirely false picture about the possible futures facing us. As I show in 
Chapter 5, by ignoring the dynamic costs of climate mitigation, these keepers of 
economic policy have massively underestimated their true value, thereby paving the 
way for economic and ecological disaster in the near future, if they are taken 
seriously. By the essay’s end, it will be clear that the costs of inviting orthodox 













The New Science of Societal Dynamics 
The critical omission in the story about climate change is the science of societal 
dynamics. While there is a science of climate change — concerning the role played by 
human society in the recent increase in omissions and temperatures — there is no 
science of climate mitigation. The reason, as discussed in Chapter 3, is that orthodox 
economics has failed to develop a general dynamic theory of human society. 
Accordingly, the proposed mitigation program is based on wishful thinking rather 
than science. As such it is a metaphysical rather than a realist program. Hence, a new 
science of societal dynamics is urgently required. 
THE NEW SCIENCE OUTLINED 
This is not as daunting as it may at first appear. There already exists a realist general 
dynamic theory of human society, called the dynamic-strategy theory. Currently it is 
ignored by the mitigation engineers precisely because it is grounded in reality and, 
therefore, undermines their metaphysical vision. It is a transdisciplinary theory that 
has demonstrated its ability to explain and predict the core relationship in disciplines 
throughout the social, behavioral, biological and cognitive sciences. 
What the dynamic-strategy theory shows is that life and human society are 
characterized by a series of biological and technological paradigm shifts, which are 
driven by the dynamic life-system. This life-system consists of a continuous process 
of circular interaction between its constituent organisms (including man) and the 
“society” of which they are a part. It is a self-starting and self-sustaining –– or 
autogenous — system driven from the demand side by “strategic desire” — the desire 
of all organisms, no matter how simple or complex, to survive and prosper — and 
facilitated either by the “strategic gene” or the “strategic cerebrum”, depending on 
their degree of sophistication. This theory has been developed over the past two 
decades. 
The desire to survive and prosper leads to a pursuit of the most effective (at a 
particular time and place) dynamic strategy from an armory of four — family 
multiplication, conquest, commerce (symbiosis), or genetic/technological change. As 
the economic opportunities of these dynamic strategies are exploited by individual 
“strategists” (risk-taking decision makers) or groups of strategists, they unfold and 
generate a growing “strategic demand” for a wide range of inputs including factors of 
production (land, labor and capital), genetic or technological ideas, institutions 
(societal rules), organizations (social networks), religion, and culture. The supply 
response — shaped by relative factor prices — to strategic demand leads to the 
growing complexity of both biological/technological structures and the societal 
environment, and to an increase in biological/physical output and output per capita (or 
living standards).  
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This dynamic life-system emerged from primeval chaos in order to convert 
solar energy into fuels that facilitated the survival and ever-increasing complexity of 
life forms, including humanity. Over the past 4,000 myrs this life-system has 
developed into a highly robust and flexible “survival machine” able to exist in any 
extremely hostile environment. In the case of the human life-system, large and abrupt 
changes in climate over the past 100,000 years have conditioned it to withstand 
similar climate-change events in the future. It is a system that not only grows 
incrementally but also periodically transforms itself in a revolutionary way via what I 
call biological or technological paradigm shifts (see Figures 4.1 and 4.2). These 
paradigm shifts take the form of genetic or technological revolutions, which radically 
change the structure of the dynamic life-system and of its constituent 
ecosociopolitical systems. In the process they generate an exponential development 
path, which has been described by the Snooks-Panov algorithm (Nazaretyan 2005). 
[Fig 4.1 at end of essay] 
This realist theory, which is based on the systematic observation of natural and 
human life-systems, was first presented in my book The Dynamic Society (1996), and 
has been developed to apply to a wide variety of intellectual disciplines since then. 
More recently, the theory as it relates to the origin and evolution of life and its natural 
systems has been published in a number of scientific journals including Advances in 
Space Research (Snooks 2005) and Complexity (Snooks 2008a). The focus in this 
chapter is on the dynamic-strategy theory as it applies to human society. A brief 
outline of the theory is followed by a discussion of the three technological paradigm 
shifts in the past, as well as the fourth paradigm shift that is predicted to begin in the 
middle decades of the twenty-first century. 
A FORMAL PRESENTATION OF THE DYNAMIC-STRATEGY THEORY 
To understand the patterns of societal dynamics in the long-run, we require a new 
dynamic theory. The old theories, unlike the dynamic patterns, tell a story of selective 
comparative statics. For this purpose the dynamic-strategy theory will be briefly 
outlined by focusing on its central features: the driving force; the dynamic 
mechanism; strategic demand and strategic confidence; the strategic demand-response 
mechanism; and strategic leadership in the Dynamic Society. 
The driving force 
The internal driving force of the Dynamic Society is the competitive struggle of 
“materialist man” to survive and prosper. This is the major outcome of our 
biologically determined desires — or “strategic desire” — that have been shaped by 
genetic change over almost 4,000 myrs. In the dynamic-strategy theory, as in life, 
ideas are an effective way of achieving our desires, but they do so in a passive way. In 
the long-run, as we will see, ideas respond to “strategic demand”. Two major 
implications emerge from this reality: altruism is not a prime determinant of human 
behavior; and the decision-making process is not dominated by neoclassical economic 
rationality. The origin, evolution and nature of strategic demand and human nature 




If ideas do not drive society, but merely facilitate the desire of its members, 
we need to replace the orthodox rationality model of decision making with a new 
realist model. Through the inductive method it is possible to derive such a model, 
which I have called the “strategic-imitation model” (Snooks 1996: 212–13; 1997: 36–
46). In reality, decision making is based on the need to economize on nature’s scarcest 
resource — intelligence. Rather than collect vast quantities of information on a large 
range of alternatives for processing through a mental model of the way the world 
works, the great majority of decision makers — whom I call the “strategic followers” 
— merely imitate those innovative people (“strategic pioneers”) and projects that are 
conspicuously successful. The only information required is that necessary to answer 
the key questions: Who and what is materially successful and why? Hence, the basic 
information needed by decision makers is the relatively inexpensive “imitative 
information”, not the prohibitively expensive benefit-cost information. Even the 
leading decision makers — the strategic pioneers — do not employ rationalist 
techniques when seeking new ways of exploiting strategic opportunities. Rather than 
exhaustively seeking out the best investment projects, they believe their investment 
projects are best. In free-enterprise societies — but not the “mitigation society” — it 
is the market that adjudicates. 
The dynamic mechanism 
The internal driving force of strategic demand is a self-starting and self-sustaining 
force that drives a dynamic mechanism that has at its centre the “strategic pursuit” — 
the pursuit of a dominant dynamic strategy to achieve the objective of survival and 
prosperity. This strategy begins as an individual or family activity that, if successful, 
is adopted by wider social groups, at first local, then regional, national and, finally, 
global. This takes place through the mechanism of “strategic imitation”, whereby 
successful pioneering initiatives are imitated by a growing number of individuals and 
groups. In this way, a successful dynamic strategy becomes the focus of political 
policies controlled by ruling strategists, or “strategic leaders”. The role of “strategic 
leadership”, which is not to be confused with “mitigation engineering”, is discussed 
below. 
The choice of dynamic strategy — from four possibilities including family 
multiplication (procreation and migration), conquest, commerce, and technological 
change — depends on the underlying economic conditions, such as factor 
endowments and the nature of external competition. A few examples will clarify what 
this meant in practice. Family-expansion societies include all societies prior to the 
Neolithic (agricultural) Revolution 10,600 years ago; commerce societies include 
Egypt, Phoenicia, Greece, Carthage, Byzantium, Venice, pre-modern Britain, and the 
Netherlands; conquest societies include most of the ancient world, such as Sumer, 
Assyria, Babylon, Persia, Rome, the Arab empires, the Mongol empires, medieval 
Europe, and Mesoamerican societies; and technological societies include all those that 
since the late eighteenth century have passed through the Industrial Revolution.  
It is a choice about the future made by strategists who invest time and 
resources in alternative dynamic strategies. The important point to realize is that 
investment in these various strategies is undertaken for the same objective — survival 
and prosperity — and involves a broadly similar process, which is the strategic  
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pursuit. The main difference is that investment in family multiplication, conquest and 
commerce is undertaken in order to achieve economic growth by gaining control of 
new external resources, while technological change is used to achieve economic 
growth by effecting greater efficiency in the use of existing internal resources. As far 
as the strategist is concerned — in contrast to the orthodox economist — there is 
nothing special about technological change. After all, economic growth in Roman 
society for a period of 1,000 years was generated knowingly through the systematic 
pursuit of conquest, not technological change. Technological change, like the other 
three dynamic strategies, is just an instrument in the more general strategic pursuit. 
Similarly, within the context of a particular dynamic strategy, strategists attempt to 
gain a competitive advantage through the adoption of new substrategies that, where 
successful, generate new “technological styles”, such as the simple mechanical 
technology adopted by Britain between 1780 and 1830 or the more sophisticated 
chemical and electrical technology employed by Germany during the mid-nineteenth 
century. 
As individuals and governments seek to exploit their physical and societal 
environment, setting in train a mass movement orchestrated through strategic 
imitation, the dominant dynamic strategy unfolds. Unfolds in the sense that its 
material opportunities are progressively exploited and, finally, exhausted. And it is 
this unfolding dynamic strategy (or a substrategy of it) that shapes the expectations of 
decision makers. The eventual exhaustion of a dynamic strategy is the outcome of the 
“law of diminishing strategic returns”, whereby the revenue and costs of strategies 
rather than factors of production are finally equated (Snooks 1998a: 202–03). The 
resulting “rise and fall” of dynamic strategies and substrategies traces out a distinctive 
wave-like pathway (see Figure 4.4), which provides the dynamic form for this model. 
This supersedes the arbitrary dynamic forms — the equilibrium growth path and the 
bifurcated pathways — adopted by supply-side neoclassical, evolutionary, and 
complexity growth theorists. A meaningful dynamic form cannot be deduced logically 
from supply-side assumptions about society. It is an existential concept, not an 
optimizing concept. 
From historical observations, however, we can derive a general dynamic form 
that encompasses a series of wave-like surges in economic development and growth 
that are separated by intervals of stability or retreat. This sequence consists of “great 
waves” of about 300 years in duration and, within these, “long waves” of about 30–
60 years. The great waves are generated by the exploitation and exhaustion of 
dynamic strategies (for example, the present industrial technology strategy) and the 
long waves by a series of substrategies (for example, the pioneering phase of the 
Industrial Revolution in Britain, 1780–1830). We should focus, however, on the 
underlying dynamic mechanism rather than the precise wave-like pattern, because 
external shocks (such as invasion, disease, and physical calamities) continually distort 
the latter. These wave-like surges should not be thought of as part of a dynamic 
“cycle”, because the intervals between them are not systematically related to the 
surges of development before and after. Each of these intervals constitutes a hiatus 
that follows the exhaustion of a dynamic strategy (or substrategy) during which the 
strategists search desperately for a replacement strategy (or substrategy). The best 
recent example of such a strategic hiatus is Japan during the 1990s and early 2000s;  
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and a possible future case could be the USA. If the strategists are successful the 
strategic sequence will continue with a replacement strategy, but, if not, the sequence 
will terminate and the society will eventually collapse. The latter ultimately occurred 
in all ancient societies. 
Strategic demand and strategic confidence 
The unfolding dynamic strategy, driven by the competitive energy of strategic 
demand (“materialist man”), plays a central role in the dynamic-strategy model. Not 
only does it provide the model with a realistic dynamic form, but it gives rise to two 
new concepts in economics — “strategic confidence” and “strategic demand”. These 
concepts explain not only the dynamics of long-run investment and saving that are left 
hanging in orthodox comparative-static macroeconomics, but also how “dynamic 
order” (usually called spontaneous order) is generated. It is the exploration of the 
demand side of dynamics that makes the dynamic-strategy theory unique in a world of 
supply-side theories, not only in economics and the other social sciences, but also in 
biology and physics (Snooks 2008a). 
  What do I mean by demand-side and supply-side theories? Supply-side 
theories model societal outcomes as if they are forced by the prime resources (largely 
human) of a country, whereas the dynamic-strategy theory models these outcomes as 
a response of society’s resources to the driving influence of dynamic demand 
generated by an unfolding dynamic strategy. For example, the pursuit of the 
commerce strategy by, say, Venice in the pre-modern period, generated a 
continuously changing demand for a wide variety of inputs – commercial capital, 
commercial expertise, shipping, docks and warehousing, overseas ports peopled by 
skilled Venetians, commercial inventions, and a variety of commercial institutions 
and organizations – to fully exploit its monopoly over trade between Western Europe 
on the one hand and Byzantium and the Levant on the other. Supply side-ists would 
argue that Venice grew rich because of its superior commercial human capital, owing 
to something special about its culture (such as its religion or Roman inheritance).  
Strategic confidence, which rises and falls with the dominant dynamic strategy 
and its various substrategies, explains the changing investment climate in the 
Dynamic Society. It provides, for example, a dynamic explanation for Keynes’ “state 
of long-term expectation”. Accordingly it plays a central role in determining the 
willingness of strategists to invest, because of its influence on the long-run expected 
rate of return, and in the creation of dynamic order (through encouraging cooperation 
and an orderly institutional structure). Confidence and expectations rise as the 
dynamic strategy unfolds, and they decline, stagnate, and may even collapse as it is 
progressively exhausted. It is important to realize that strategic confidence is 
unaffected by the speculative excesses of the stock exchange (the “casino”) or of the 
financial sector, as these are merely ephemeral supply-side disturbances (Snooks 
2008d). Strategic confidence also binds society together. 
Strategic demand — or dynamic demand — also waxes and wanes with the 
dominant dynamic strategy or substrategy. It comprises the effective demand 
exercised by decision makers for a wide range of physical, intellectual and 
institutional inputs required in the strategic pursuit. In exploiting expanding strategic  
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opportunities, entrepreneurs need to invest in new infrastructure; to purchase 
intermediate goods and services; to employ labor skills; to acquire, renovate, or 
construct the necessary buildings, machinery, and equipment; to engage professional 
expertise; and to develop new facilitating social rules and organizations. Strategic 
demand, therefore, is the central active principle in our demand-side model. Naturally 
the supply response of population change, capital formation, technological change, 
and institutional transformation, which are influenced by changes in relative prices, 
will contribute to the way in which strategic opportunities are exploited; but they do 
so passively. This concept turns Say’s Law — which was accepted explicitly by the 
classical economists and implicitly by neoclassical economists — on its head: in the 
Dynamic Society, dynamic demand creates its own supply, not the other way around. 
The strategic demand-supply response 
With the dynamic-strategy model we can shift focus from short-run, comparative-
static macroeconomics to long-run dynamics by considering the interaction between 
strategic demand and the response of the supply-side variables. It is this interaction 
that causes the dynamic strategy to unfold and, hence, gives rise to the dynamic form 
of our model, and to the dynamic role played by strategic inflation in facilitating the 
supply response. “Strategic inflation” – or “good” inflation – is the widespread 
increase in prices resulting from the pressure of strategic demand on resources, 
commodities, and ideas. With the introduction of a new dynamic strategy/substrategy, 
the resulting expansion of strategic demand will lead to an increase in prices of key 
inputs, but will not generate strategic inflation until the next strategy exerts 
widespread influence throughout a given society. Economic growth of a traditional 
and unadventurous (that is, nonstrategic) kind that occurs within the context of known 
and available resources may not lead to much inflation at all. But this nonstrategic 
growth will not last for long. “Nonstrategic inflation” – or “bad” inflation – on the 
other hand, is the increase of prices resulting from errors in monetary and fiscal policy 
or the action of monopolies in either factor or commodity markets at home and 
abroad. 
Herein lie the major differences between strategic theory and orthodox theory. 
In neoclassical economics the supply side is, by default, treated as the active force in 
society (supply creates it own demand), which has no place for strategic inflation; 
while in Keynesian economics the supply-side variables are merely assumed to be 
given and “effective demand” is a comparative-static, national-accounting concept. 
By contrast, in the dynamic-strategy model, strategic demand provides the active 
force to which the supply-side variables respond according to their supply costs. 
Strategic inflation, which provides the incentive system in this strategic demand-
response mechanism, is a stable, non-accelerating function of economic growth. This 
theoretical relationship can be (and has been) estimated in the form of the “growth-
inflation curve” over all timeframes — including the very long-run (past 1,000 years), 
the long-run (past 100 years), and shortrun (1960s–1990s). These growth-inflation 
curves are estimated and discussed in my book Longrun Dynamics (1998b: 151–59). 
Inflation targeting, where this constrains strategic inflation (as it invariably does), acts 
as a brake on the unfolding dynamic strategy, as occurred dramatically around the 
globe in 2008–09. To eliminate strategic inflation in the long-run is to eliminate 
economic growth. Hence, it is fascinating that in the Stern Report, stabilization  
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targeting is a concept based on the bankrupt idea of inflation targeting, because both 
work to undermine the dynamic mechanism driving human society. 
Population, labor supply, capital formation, and technological, institutional 
and cultural ideas all respond to the unfolding dynamic strategy. Changes in these 
supply-side variables, both in terms of composition and growth rates, are a function of 
changing strategic opportunities. These variables expand and become more complex 
as the dominant dynamic strategy is exploited; and they stagnate, decline, and lose 
purpose, as the dynamic strategy is progressively exhausted and marginal strategic 
returns decline. Rapidly rising and falling prices form the catalyst for these dynamic 
developments. Naturally, supply-side costs play a role in shaping the strategic 
response, but this is a passive rather than an active role. Difficulties of supply are met 
by substitution of other resources and/or by innovation. In this way the supply-side 
variables are internalized in the dynamic-strategy model. Dynamic demand creates its 
own supply, and, in the process, creates the technological development pathway. 
Large-scale interventions, as proposed by the IPCC, Stern, and others, will merely 
subvert this dynamic process. 
The role of strategic leadership 
Strategic leadership, which is also a response to strategic demand, is essential to the 
survival and prosperity of human society. It was the primary reason for the emergence 
of government at the dawn of civilization and for its extension and maintenance ever 
since. Basically it involves facilitating the objectives of society’s dynamic strategists 
by coordinating their efforts and not by setting these objectives or compelling the 
strategists to comply as required by the mitigation engineers. In particular the 
strategic state provides basic infrastructure required by the unfolding dynamic 
strategy that is beyond the risk threshold and financial resources of individual and 
corporations; it negotiates political and commercial deals with other societies; it 
protects the dynamic strategy at home and abroad; it encourages the emergence of 
new strategies during recessions/depressions; and it provides basic facilities for 
education, training and research required to nourish the long-term health of the 
prevailing dynamic strategy, whether it be conquest, commerce, or technological 
change. This is a proactive rather than a passive role, and it is undertaken by the 
representatives of the strategists for the benefit of the strategists. This is discussed in 
detail in my books The Ephemeral Civilization (1997: 54–8) and The Global Crisis 
Makers (2000: 59–111). 
It is important to realize that the strategists do not necessarily encompass the 
entire population of a society. They include only those individuals who invest in the 
dominant dynamic strategy, either in physical or human-capital terms. The proportion 
of the population that can be classified as being among the strategists has varied 
throughout human history, not in a linear but in a circular way (Snooks 1997: ch. 3). 
In paleolithic (hunter-gatherer) society, almost 100 percent of adult members were 
actively involved in the family-multiplication strategy (for example, Aboriginal 
Australia). Hence, family and tribal leaders had to take into consideration the 
aspirations of all adults. By contrast, in neolithic (agricultural) societies, only a small 
proportion of the population was actively engaged in the strategic pursuit, while the 
great majority were nonstrategists, being deprived of their liberty by the ruling elite.  
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The proportion of strategists in the population ranged from less than 1 percent in 
conquest societies (for example, Anglo-Norman England) to about one-quarter in 
commerce societies (ancient Greece or medieval Venice). Only in advanced 
technological societies has the strategist/population ratio once more approached that 
of hunter-gatherer societies. Curiously the close historical relationship between 
dynamic strategists and their leaders has, since the 1970s, broken down in the modern 
world. And with this breakdown of strategic leadership, governments have neglected 
modern technological dynamic strategies in favor of military adventurism in the 
Middle East, Georgia, and elsewhere. They have also been seduced by interventionist 
notions of an antistrategic kind, such as climate mitigation and large-scale financial 
support of failing corporations. 
Metaphysics poses a great threat to the age-old positive role of strategic 
leadership. Under the influence of the neoliberals and neo-conservatives, the 
facilitating role of strategic leadership has been belittled and perverted to support 
military adventures in various parts of the world. On the other hand, under the 
influence of the mitigation engineers, there has been the demand for a new change in 
the role of government leadership. The introduction and maintenance of their climate-
mitigation program requires governments to hijack rather than facilitate the strategic 
pursuit by taking the age-old initiative away from the strategists in order to set 
society’s goals, directions, incentives and technologies — under the guidance of the 
mitigationists of course. They want governments to substitute metaphysical goals for 
strategic goals and to assume responsibility for driving the introduction and 
development of low-carbon technologies. As shown in Chapter 5, this is a recipe for 
disaster. Now we turn to the exponential technological pathway. 
THE EXPONENTIAL TECHNOLOGICAL PATHWAY 
By employing both the observed patterns of history and the general dynamic-strategy 
model we can identify and explain the three great interlocking mechanisms of the 
Dynamic Society that have been operating over the past two million years. Our 
general model generates distinct but related processes of economic change in different 
historical circumstances. But even these different circumstances are related to each 
other by an overarching global dynamic structure. This is the “technological pathway” 
consisting of “great technological paradigm shifts” (see Figure 4.2) that have been 
occurring at geometrically diminishing intervals since the emergence of mankind in 
the form of the paleolithic (hunting), neolithic (agricultural), and industrial (modern) 
revolutions. Within this global dynamic structure, the dominant mechanisms of 
change are the “great dispersion” during the paleolithic era, the “great wheel of 
civilization” during the neolithic era, and the “great linear waves of economic 
change” during the modern era. Each of these mechanisms of transformation, driven 
by the materialist pursuit of dynamic strategies, has carried human society towards the 
upper limits of the prevailing technological paradigm and, hence, to a new 
technological paradigm shift. This exponential technological development path was 
generated despite the onset of a significant number of large and abrupt climate-change 
episodes, owing to the growing resilience of the dynamic life-system. 
[Figure 4.2 at end of essay]  
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A global dynamic structure 
As shown in The Dynamic Society (1996: ch. 12), the process by which global 
technological paradigm shifts emerge is accelerating in a geometric fashion. The time 
taken for the technological shifts to occur involved hundreds of thousands of years for 
the Paleolithic, 4,000 years for the Neolithic, and 100 years for the Industrial 
Revolution. The time taken to transmit these new paradigms around the known world 
was about 1.2 million years for the Paleolithic, 3,000 plus years for the Old-World 
Neolithic, and 200 plus years for the Industrial Revolution. And the interval between 
the Paleolithic and Neolithic revolutions was about 2 million years, whereas that 
between the Neolithic and Industrial Revolutions was about 10,000 years. The reason 
for this global acceleration is that the outputs of one round of technological change 
become the inputs of the next. 
The global development path implied by the great technological paradigm 
shifts can be illustrated by reference to Figure 4.2, which encompasses all societies in 
the know world in the history of human society. It is designed to show two things: the 
stepped profile of potential real GDP per capita at the global level made possible by 
the three paradigm shifts (heavy line); and the more gradual increase in actual real 
GDP per capita (broken line). Potential GDP per capita increases relatively steeply — 
becoming more steep as we approach the present — but is then stationary for much 
longer periods that diminish geometrically over time. By contrast, actual GDP per 
capita increases only gradually to the potential ceiling and describes a more wave-like 
development path. This catching-up process by actual GDP per capita is driven by the 
three great mechanisms discussed more fully below. Once global resources have been 
fully employed in the current technological paradigm, actual income will press 
persistently against the potential ceiling. This is when the next technological 
revolution takes place, because the alternative is stagnation and collapse for the 
leading global societies. Humanity will face precisely this transforming situation in 
the middle decades of the twenty-first century. 
The great dispersion 
The first historical mechanism to drive a technological paradigm shift was the great 
dispersion of the paleolithic era. This involved the adoption of the extremely slow but 
very effective dynamic strategy of family multiplication (of procreation and 
migration) to enable greater family control over unused natural resources, which were 
utilized through a hunter-gathered technology. This great dispersion probably began 
in Africa about 100,000 years ago. By 40,000 years ago modern man had reached 
most parts of the globe, and by 11,000 years ago in the Old World and 7,000 years 
ago in the New World all resources had been fully utilized — the paleolithic ceiling 
of potential GDP per capita had been reached. This pressure on resources was most 
intense in those narrow necks of land — which I call “funnels of transformation” — 
through which relatively large numbers of people passed, where population density 
was relatively high, and where competition was more intense. In the fertile crescent of 
the Old World and the Mesoamerican isthmus of the New World the incentives for 
adopting new ways of using scarce resources were greatest. These were the cradles of 
the Neolithic Revolution.  
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The great wheel of civilization 
The mechanism driving the technological paradigm shift between the Neolithic and 
Modern eras was what I call the “great wheel of civilization”. Each rotation of the 
great wheel brought the Dynamic Society closer to the limit of the old neolithic 
paradigm through population expansion and the transmission of ideas. This dynamic 
process, which underlies the rise and fall of ancient civilizations in both the Old and 
New Worlds, was in turn driven by the dynamic strategy of conquest. The reason for 
the eternal recurrence of the ancient world is that the conqueror must rebuild his 
empire anew on each and every occasion. Only through the modern technological 
strategy can the great wheel be broken and civilization be set free to pursue a 
sustained linear development path. Yet even this escape will not be permanent if we 
forget how we broke away and allow the mitigation engineers to lock us into the old 
polluting fossil-fuel paradigm. 
The great wheel of ancient civilization rotates slowly in historical space 
without gaining the technological traction required to drive global GDP per capita 
upwards over the long-run. In Figure 4.3, four great wheels of economic growth have 
been arbitrarily depicted, each of which represents a single ancient Western 
civilization in a series of successions — Sumer, Assyria, Greece, and Rome. While 
the diameters of the wheels are slightly different owing to a marginal improvement in 
living standards over time as military and organization structures became more 
efficient, they have a common axis, which is fixed by a shared production technology. 
It is well known that, while military technology changes significantly over these three 
millennia, production technology changed only marginally. 
[Fig 4.3 at end of essay] 
How does the “great-wheel” diagram work? It is important to realize that 
while the “great-steps” diagram (Figure 4.2) operates at the global level, the “great-
wheel” diagram (Figure 4.3) operates at the level of the individual society; and that 
time on the horizontal axis is not continuous (that is, time cannot move back on 
itself). Each rotation of the great wheel for these societies took between one and two 
millennia. We start at the low point of the wheel. The origin, a, of each civilization is 
small and unimpressive and, with the exception of the pioneering society of Sumer, is 
overshadowed by its predecessor. As the internal energy of materialist man is 
translated into economic expansion through, initially, family multiplication, the 
incipient core of our new civilization borrows ideas and techniques from its 
predecessor and applies these to its expansion process. As real GDP per capita grows, 
the great wheel begins to turn slowly anew. Once our society has borrowed all it can 
from the past, the wheel has reached point b, the maximum level of real GPD per 
capita that can be generated from the neolithic economic system common to the 
ancient world. 
This is a critical point at which the great wheel could stop, and even rotate 
backwards. The most cost-effective way of maintaining positive economic growth in 
ancient societies — of maintaining the upward swing of the great wheel — is through 
the adoption of the dynamic strategy of conquest. Only a fortunate few were able to 
achieve this through commerce (the Archaic Greeks and the Phoenicians) and even  
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these were eventually overwhelmed by conquest societies. For a successful conquest 
strategy, the great wheel continues to rotate upwards from b to c as the flow of 
plundered income and resources from outside increases. But, inevitably, the conquest 
(or commerce) strategy is exhausted (when strategic benefits and costs are equated), 
the inflow of external resources dries up, and the former conquest society is thrown 
back on its own internal resources. Hence, the great wheel begins to rotate downwards 
to d and beyond. The stationary state is not possible in a highly competitive world. As 
the underlying neolithic production technology is not sufficient to support such high 
living standards and populations, the great wheel rotates from d to e, and eventually 
disintegrates (back to a) as Rome did between AD 200 and 476, and as the modern 
world will do if the mitigation engineers have their way. 
The great linear waves of economic change 
The Industrial Revolution not only ushered in a new technological paradigm, it also 
began a new era in which linear, if fluctuating, economic growth was possible (see 
Figure 4.4). This was unprecedented in human history. The great linear waves of 
economic change are generated by the modern technological strategy (or component 
substrategies), and they are responsible for driving the modern industrial 
technological paradigm to exhaustion and, if the mitigation engineers can be 
restrained, to a new technological dawn. 
[Fig 4.4 at end of essay] 
It is important to realize that these wave-like surges of about 300 years are not 
systematically related in some sort of mechanical way as orthodox trade-cycle theory 
might, if it recognized them, claim. In reality there is no system of very long cycles. 
The intervals between these great waves are just that — intervals between the 
exhaustion of one dynamic strategy and the emergence and exploitation of another. 
During each of these intervals — a period of “hiatus” — the strategic pioneers are 
involved in a desperate attempt to launch a new strategy owing to the adverse impact 
of external competition on real living standards. Each hiatus is a vulnerable time for 
any society, because strategic replacement is not inevitable. Failure to generate a new 
strategy will lead a society to stagnate and, possibly, collapse. It is for this reason I 
stress that modern linear development takes place through a succession of 
unsystematic “waves” rather than through mechanical cycles in which downturn and 
contraction are followed necessarily by upturn and expansion. 
The precise length of these waves, measured not from peak to peak as in trade 
cycles but from trough to peak as in wave-like fluctuations, should not concern us 
greatly. My research for The Dynamic Society (1996) and The Ephemeral Civilization 
(1997) suggests that the upswing of the “great waves” (reflecting the unfolding of full 
dynamic strategies) in both the ancient and modern worlds is about 300 years in 
duration, and of the “long waves” (reflecting the unfolding of substrategies) is about 
20 to 60 years. Random external shocks help to distort this pattern. Far more 
important is the dynamic mechanism that underlies these wave-like surges. Any 
predictions we are prepared to make about economic progress in the future must be 
based on the underlying dynamic model, and the laws that can be derived from it, 
rather than on fixed (and, hence, inevitably wrong) assertions about wave length.  
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Much of the recent (and distant) literature has focused, mistakenly, on the predictive 
value of cycle length. As a result it has been largely discredited (Solomou 1987). This 
is the old historicist fallacy revisited — not for the only time in our survey of the 
conventional wisdom, as we saw in chapters 2 and 3. 
THE STRATEGIC MODEL OF INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 
Societal rules (or “institutions”), both formal (laws) and informal (customs), are 
established and altered to facilitate the dynamic strategies by which decision makers 
attempt to maximize their changes of survival and prosperity, and to impose the 
dynamic tactics by which competing groups attempt to control the distribution of 
society’s wealth. These rules are required to economize not on cost-benefit 
information as Douglass North (1990) and the new institutionalists assert but on 
nature’s scarcest resource — the intellect. Similarly, societal “organizations” of all 
types — economic, political, and social — also largely respond to these dynamic 
strategies and tactics, rather than to institutions as the new institutionalists suggest. 
Society’s institutions and organizations, therefore, are driven not by some sort of 
evolutionary process as commonly claimed but by strategic demand that arises from 
the unfolding of the dominant dynamic strategy. Social evolution is a myth. 
Strategic demand provides the incentives, opportunities and imperatives for 
the changing — the ephemeral — structure of civilization. As shown in The 
Ephemeral Civilization (1997), the strategic phases of adoption, expansion, decline 
and exhaustion have a characteristic impact on observed changes in the 
institutional/organizational structure of society. Institutional change has no life of its 
own. It cannot evolve in isolation from what is happening in the real economy. It is 
reactive not proactive, facilitating not initiating. It has no evolutionary logic and, 
therefore, no laws of its own. This is why we need not take the excited ephemeral 
gyrations of the financial sector (as in the second half of 2008) at all seriously 
(Snooks 2008d). 
If the long-run “strategic sequence” were to reverse itself, the sociopolitical 
structure would also do so. The only reason that the last millennium in Britain gives 
the impression that democratic sociopolitical institutions and organizations have 
“evolved” is that the strategic sequence has been conquest → commerce → 
technological change (the reason for this is discussed in The Ephemeral Civilization 
(1997: 338–340). Had it been conquest → commerce → conquest as it was 
throughout the premodern period (for example, ancient Greece and medieval Venice), 
then the growing democratization of the middle, commerce phase would have been 
turned back to autocracy once more. The same will happen in the future if our current 
technological strategy is replaced by a conquest strategy (as occurred in Germany and 
Japan in the mid twentieth century), by, for example, a fanatical climate-change 
dictator. This, of course, is not possible in the evolutionary model, where non-
marginal change is irreversible. In the end it must be recognized that human 
civilization is merely a vehicle for achieving the basic desires of mankind, and that, 
while the dynamic process is eternal, the rites of civilization are ephemeral. 
The central mechanism of institutional change in the dynamic-strategy model 
is the competitive struggle between various groups in society for control of the  
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dominant dynamic strategy. This is the struggle between strategists, nonstrategists and 
antistrategists: of which the most recent example is that between the antistrategic 
(metaphysical) mitigation engineers and the strategic (realist) corporate sector. The 
only reason modern societies possess democratic sociopolitical institutions is that 
their entire populations have been drawn into the ruling strategic group. This has not 
been a linear, but a circular, historical development. As suggested earlier, whereas in 
hunger-gatherer societies most of their populations were strategists, in conquest 
societies the landowning warriors constituted a tiny ruling elite, in commerce societies 
their ruling class was extended to include the mercantile middle class, and in 
technological societies the ruling class embraced, once more, the bulk of the 
population who invested funds and/or skills in the modern dynamic strategy. The way 
this works is discussed in detail in The Ephemeral Civilization (1997). 
The point I am trying to make is that, as there is no independent dynamic 
mechanism underlying institutional change, there can be no independent laws 
governing it. The great quest of the new institutionalists to discover a general model 
of societal rules, therefore, is futile. It is a quest for the Holy Grail. While there 
certainly are regularities, or recurring patterns, in institutional formation throughout 
space and time – such as between the conquest societies of Assyria or Rome or the 
commerce societies of Greece and Carthage – they are the outcome of the real 
economy’s dynamic and not of any independent institutional mechanism. Hence, the 
laws of institutional change must be derived from the fundamental laws of social 
dynamics. The ephemeral nature of civilization can only be understood in terms of the 
eternal forces that drive the Dynamic Society. 
A NEW SCIENCE OF SOCIETY 
As shown in Chapter 3, orthodox economics, usually considered to be “at the cutting 
edge of the social sciences” (Wilson 1999: 219), has nothing of significance to say 
about the past and future dynamics of human society. Hence, the only way to 
understand the future role of climate change, generally acknowledged to reflect 
modern human activities, is by developing a new science of society — what I call the 
science of stratology. The foundation for this new science is the dynamic-strategy 
theory outlined above. 
In this chapter I have attempted to show that the dynamic-strategy theory has 
enabled the identification of the dynamic life-system that makes it possible for life 
forms to survive and prosper in a hostile world — including a world subject to abrupt 
and rapid climate change. As this system is self-starting and self-sustaining, it doesn’t 
require any external interventions to ensure it operates properly. The dynamic life-
system establishes its own goals, directions and incentives and communicates these 
via strategic demand for a range of strategic inputs through various markets and 
attendant price mechanisms. The failure to understand the presence and operation of 
the dynamic life-system has led metaphysicians of various types — including 
Marxists and mitigation engineers — to propose artificial goals and the directives and 
incentives for achieving them. This has the very real potential for distorting, even 
derailing, the dynamic life-system, with disastrous consequences.  
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The societal theory outlined in this chapter provides a way of thinking about 
the dynamic life-system and how it generates the development patterns of the past and 
future. In particular, how it generates the technological development path that 
proceeds via a series of geometrically related paradigm shifts. It is the knowledge this 
theory provides that is essential to an understanding of the pattern of societal 
dynamics and its interaction with climate change. It provides the basis for a new 
science of societal dynamics. In Chapter 5, this knowledge enables us to calculate a 
realist version of likely greenhouse-gas concentrations, human-induced temperature 
changes, the benefits of “allowing” the dynamic life-system to work unhindered so as 
to generate the fourth technological paradigm shift — the Solar Revolution — and the 
















Mitigation or Revolution? The Real Costs and Benefits 
In this chapter two alternative futures for humanity are outlined. The first involves the 
future that would be generated by the dynamic life-system free to do what it does best 
— ensure the survival and prosperity of life forms in a hostile physical world. The 
second is that proposed by the mitigation engineers, who are completely unaware of 
the presence or operation of the dynamic life-system either in the past or in the future: 
namely the introduction of a comprehensive climate-mitigation program that will 
distort, even derail, the dynamic life-system, and inevitably delay, even completely 
prevent, the emergence of the fourth technological paradigm shift. In effect this will 
involve a future clash between the antistrategic mitigation engineers and the global 
strategists, similar in nature but potentially much more destructive than the clash 
between the antistrategists (USSR and China) and the strategists (the Western powers) 
during the Cold War. Whatever decision humanity makes in this respect, we should 
be aware of the likely consequences of our actions. 
THE SOLAR REVOLUTION 
When the dynamic-strategy theory was first published in The Dynamic Society (1996) 
— but actually worked out in the early 1990s — I made a number of predictions about 
the future technological development path for human society that are relevant to the 
climate-change debate. At the time there was a concern among the radical ecologists 
— who I called the “ecological engineers” — that population growth, which they 
wrongly viewed as an increasing function of economic growth, was irreparably 
damaging the natural environment and, thereby, leading to the inevitable collapse of 
human society. These doomsters included the “limits-to-growth” people (Meadows et 
al 1972; 1992) together with radical ecologists such as Paul Ehrlich (The Population 
Explosion, 1990) and David Suzuki (1990). They demanded that human society 
“immediately” attempt to live within its physical limits by eliminating economic 
growth, which, they incorrectly claimed, was driving population growth, which was 
destroying the planet. If we failed to do this “immediately” human society would 
collapse sometime during the early part of the twenty-first century. These predictions 
were based, at best, on simple engineering models (with feedback effects) that 
extrapolate certain key variables into the future on the assumptions that appeared 
relevant to the ecological engineers at the time (Snooks 1996: 103–110). As the 
dynamic-strategy theory shows, population growth is a response, via strategic 
demand, to the type of dynamic strategy being pursued, not to economic growth. 
While earlier dynamic strategies of family multiplication, commerce, and conquest 
required population growth to feed the unfolding strategic process, the current 
dynamic strategy of technological change does not because it is able to extract 
increasing services from a given supply of labor and resources. At heart, these 
historicist models have much in common with those used by climate-change scientists 
and orthodox economists today.  
47 
 
The Dynamic Society (Snooks 1996) identified problems with both these 
models and the assumed relationship between variables like economic growth and 
population change. In particular, it was demonstrated that these models were not 
based on a realist general dynamic-strategy model and, as a consequence, could not 
foresee the forthcoming technological revolution that would enable human society to 
break through the alleged physical “limits to growth”. As it turned out, global 
economic growth did not abate — in fact it increased owing to the rapid development 
achieved by China, India, and Southeast Asia, at a time of continued growth in the 
West. Despite this, the world was not overwhelmed with population, and the 
dynamics of human society did not crash as the ecological engineers predicted. After 
the turn of the century, it became more widely recognized that there was no simple 
relationship between the growth of both living standards and population, just as had 
been shown theoretically and empirically in my books The Dynamic Society (1996), 
The Ephemeral Civilization (1997), and Global Transition (1999). 
Owing to the failure of their predictions of disaster, and the irrelevance of their 
theoretical models, the limits-to-growth groups (including the radical ecologists like 
Ehrlich and Suzuki) just withered away. Only to be replaced by the climate-change 
fraternity, using more sophisticated versions of the same historicist models that are 
also unable to capture the dynamics of human society or predict the forthcoming 
technological paradigm shift. When pushed, the climate-change people also display 
the old anti-growth and anti-population sentiments, but, owing to the failure of their 
predecessors, they express these flawed ideas more carefully. 
Here is what I said about the forthcoming technological revolution in The 
Dynamic Society (1996: 429): 
In Chapter 9 it was shown that the distance between paradigm shifts 
and their duration has been declining in a geometric fashion. The time 
taken for the technological shifts to occur involved hundreds of 
thousands of years for the Paleolithic (c. 1.6 myrs ago), 4,000 years for 
the Neolithic (10,600 years ago), and 100 years for the Industrial (c. 
1760) Revolutions. This suggests that the next paradigm shift could 
begin soon and could be completed in no more than a generation or so. 
The future revolution, as history has suggested, will release population 
from the present resources limit and, as a result, actually reduce 
environmental degradation. This is because it will no longer be 
necessary to push natural resources to their limits with an increasingly 
restricted technology, and because higher levels of real GDP per capita 
in the Third World will lead to a levelling-off of population, as has 
already occurred in developed nations … The present concerns about 
overpopulation and environment degradation, therefore, will be 
overcome by the future technological paradigm shift … But this is not 
to say that we should abandon attempts to protect the environment, just 
that we should not allow this remedial action to derail the Dynamic 
Society. 
In the early 1990s, armed with the dynamic-strategy theory, it was clear to me 
that the industrial technological paradigm had already entered its exhaustion phase,  
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and would be replaced in the middle decades of the twenty-first century by a new 
technological paradigm. The degradation of the environment that was of concern to 
the ecologists at the time was a sign of this. Their error was to read the evidence of 
paradigm exhaustion as signs of ecological and societal collapse, and this error was an 
outcome of the failure to develop a general dynamic theory of human society. As I 
said in The Dynamic Society (Snooks 1996: 428–29), the radical ecologists 
by persuading even a significant proportion of individuals and global 
organisations that the historically familiar signs of a technological 
paradigm approaching exhaustion are instead the signs of a world 
teetering on the edge of darkness … may do considerable and 
unnecessary damage. Through costly and unnecessary government 
intervention at the national and global levels, they may contribute both 
to the weakening of Western civilization … and to the delay in any 
future technological paradigm shift. 
Since the early 1990s, other evidence of an exhausting technological paradigm 
has emerged. This includes the rapidly diminishing supplies of fossil fuels — 
particularly petroleum — available at economic prices, and the growing costs of 
reducing the carbon emitted by their use in production, heating, and transport. In 
response to the potential energy-supply problems, industrialized countries are already 
positioning themselves strategically to secure oil supplies. These countries include the 
USA in the Middle East and Russia in Georgia. These wars are all about diminishing 
supplies of oil, not about “terrorism”, “weapons of mass destruction”, the existence of 
brutal dictators, or the rights of nationals in neighboring countries. 
It is worth considering the situation regarding global oil and coal supplies in 
greater detail owing to the central role they play in providing energy in the industrial 
technological paradigm. The signs that the “golden age of oil” has passed have been 
accumulating for some time. In 1962 the global discovery of new oil fields peaked; in 
1970 total oil production peaked in the USA (something the industry in the 1950s said 
could not happen), Venezuela and Libya; in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s it peaked in 
Iran, Canada (conventional supplies), Romania, Indonesia, Egypt, India, Syria, 
Gabon, Malaysia, Argentina, Colombia, Ecuador and Great Britain; and in the early 
years of the twenty-first century these countries were joined by Norway, Oman, 
Mexico and Australia. Of the remaining oil producers, Kuwait is expected to peak in 
2013, Saudi Arabia in 2014, and Iraq in 2018. While China and Canada (exploiting oil 
sands) are expanding production rapidly, they too are expected to peak before 2020. 
Although the data are difficult to assess accurately, many observers (see Energy 
Bulletin) believe that global oil production has either peaked or is about to peak. 
With the passing of global peak oil production and the exponential growth of 
world demand — driven particularly by the rapid industrialization of China, India, 
and Southeast Asia — cheap oil will quickly become a thing of the past. Certainly by 
the middle decades of the twenty-first century, oil reserves will be unable to support 
civilization as we know it (Hirsch 2005), if we become trapped in the current 
industrial technological paradigm.  
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What of coal, that other energy mainstay of the industrial paradigm? The 
situation with coal is less clear owing to the poor quality of the data. It is generally 
thought, however, that data concerning “reserves” and “resources” are considerably 
biased on the high side. Over the past couple of decades regional estimates of both 
reserves and resources have been downgraded quite dramatically in some instances. 
Only estimates of “proved” recoverable reserves can be used when evaluating global 
coal supplies. Of these total global reserves, some 81 percent are found in just six 
countries (in descending order): USA, Russia, China, India, Australia, and South 
Africa (Coal Research 2007). It is thought that coal production will continue to 
increase up to 2020, will then plateau, peak around 2025 at a level 30 percent higher 
than current levels, and then begin an inevitable decline (Zittel and Schindler 2007). 
This is regarded as a “best case” scenario. Of course, the ability of the coal industry to 
supply an exponentially growing demand for energy will be complicated by the 
interventions of the mitigation engineers. As with oil, it is highly doubtful that coal 
will be in a position to support civilization as we know it if we are locked into the old 
industrial technological paradigm. Those who are more optimistic about the supplies 
of oil, natural gas, and coal usually make the mistake of underestimating the demand 
for these resources, which will grow at a rapid exponential rate over the next 
generation, as China, India and the rest of Asia continues to develop rapidly. 
We have also begun to see land being diverted from the production of timber 
and food to the planting of biofuel crops. This is an echo of the situation in Western 
Europe during the mid-eighteenth century, when land for human food crops was being 
diverted to growing oats to feed the rapidly increasing number of horses, which were 
the main source of motive power for transport, agriculture, and even manufacturing. 
In addition, as timber and wood were major sources of construction, machinery 
manufacture, heat, and thermal power, the rapid growth of European societies was 
effectively eliminating accessible forests and increasing the cost of employing this 
essential resource in the pre-industrial era. Only the occurrence of the Industrial 
Revolution removed this pressure on the natural environment, reduced costs of 
production, and raised standards of living. 
So it will be in the first half of the twenty-first century. As the industrial 
technological paradigm is progressively exhausted, costs of fossil fuels will continue 
to rise, long-run economic growth and living standards will stagnate and even begin to 
decline by the middle decades of this century. In turn this situation will generate the 
incentives — indeed the imperative if we hope to survive and prosper — to introduce 
an entirely new technological paradigm. This will not be a gradual development, but 
will involve a quantum leap for human society, most likely taking place within the 
generation following the middle of the twenty-first century. While the earlier 
Paleolithic, Neolithic, and Modern (Industrial) Revolutions also involved quantum 
leaps, the rate at which this has been occurring along the technological development 
path is increasing exponentially. 
The new technological paradigm will completely transcend any of the low-
carbon technologies that are currently in operation or even on the drawing board, as 
these “alternative” technologies are all part of the old industrial technological 
paradigm. The situation will be similar to the way the technology of the Industrial  
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Revolution completely transcended the “alternative” technologies of wind and water 
mills — alternative to the use of animal and human power — of the existing neolithic 
paradigm. 
What will this new technological paradigm involve? Nothing that we can 
currently envisage or image. Here is what I said about the forthcoming technological 
paradigm shift back in the early 1990s. 
What will the fourth technological paradigm bring? To answer this 
question would be like attempting in 1750 to say what would unfold 
from the Industrial Revolution. While there were signs to be read in the 
mid-eighteenth century, such as the growing use of fossil fuels, there 
was no way to tell where it would all end. Yet we can speculate 
sensibly about a central feature of all economic revolutions — the 
source of energy. The first revolution saw the extension of human 
energy with the use of more efficient tools; the second revolution saw 
the partial substitution of animal, water and wind energy for human 
energy; and the third revolution saw the substitution of thermal energy 
based upon fossil fuels for both human and animal energy. It appears 
highly likely that the fourth revolution will involve the substitution of 
solar energy for fossil-fuel energy. This will resolve, for all practical 
purposes, the problem that increasing entropy … might ultimately pose 
for the dynamics of human society. From the fourth revolution, 
physical constraints upon growth will be limited only by the flow of 
solar energy. (Snooks 1996: 430) 
I called this fourth technological paradigm shift the “Solar Revolution”. And 
throughout this essay, the term “Solar Revolution” has been employed only in 
reference to the fourth technological paradigm shift, not (as some have mistakenly 
done recently) to the low carbon technologies that have emerged from the old 
industrial technological paradigm. 
A key question is: Where will the Solar Revolution take place? In The 
Dynamic Society (Snooks 1996: 225–27, 434) I argued that technological revolutions 
have occurred in “funnels of transformation”, which can be thought of as 
geographically or economically constrained regions at the center of an exhausting 
technological paradigm. These regions are characterized by heightened competition, 
higher population interaction, greater pressure on natural resources, and greater 
exchange of ideas. These funnels of transformation – these regions in the vanguard of 
technological revolution – have included the Rift Valley of eastern Africa for the 
hunting revolution; the Fertile Crescent (Old World) and the Mesoamerican isthmus 
(New World) for the agricultural revolution; and the western edge of Europe for the 
Industrial Revolution. 
What of the forthcoming Solar Revolution? The dynamic-strategy theory 
suggests that the future technological revolution will take place where the strategic 
pursuit is most advanced and least restricted by a command mitigation system; where 
pressure on natural resources is most intense; where investment in deep scientific 
research and innovation is highest; and where economic growth is based on an  
51 
 
internally generated dynamic process (as opposed to an externally dependent process). 
The initial losers, even in the developed world, will be those countries that intervene 
most in the operation of their dynamic life-system; that adopt command mitigation 
economies; that fail to realize the current pressure on natural resources is a function of 
the approaching technological revolution; that do not regard deep scientific research 
as their top investment priority; that rely on external forces to drive their economies; 
and that take the advice of metaphysical economists (neoclassical) and scientists 
(climate mitigationists) seriously. Countries such as Australia, while affluent, fall into 
the loser category (Snooks 2008c; 2008d). 
The Solar Revolution will not only transform human society, it will make the 
“need” for climate-mitigation policies totally redundant. But this will only occur if we 
refrain from the massive intervention being proposed by climate-change scientists and 
interventionist economists such as Nicholas Stern. Mitigation like that advocated in 
the Stern Report will distort the human life-system at both the national and global 
levels; will lock in the old paradigm’s low-carbon technologies; will keep us captive 
in an exhausted technological paradigm that is no longer capable of generating 
economic growth; and will provide regional strongmen with highly tempting 
incentives to pursue the only alterative dynamic strategy to technological change — 
the strategy of conquest. This sequence of outcomes, which would follow directly 
from a rigid adherence to a through program of climate mitigation, would generate 
massive dynamic costs that Stern and other climate-change economists have 
completely overlooked in their comparative-static framework of analysis. It is time, 
therefore, to measure these dynamic costs of climate mitigation. 
THE DYNAMIC COSTS OF CLIMATE MITIGATION 
The impact of mitigation 
The key argument in this section is that a determined global effort to impose a 
comprehensive climate-mitigation program on all nations would cause at least a delay 
in the emergence of the fourth technological paradigm shift — the real Solar 
Revolution. Why? Because, in effect, the dynamic life-system will be hijacked by the 
mitigation engineers. Instead of strategists responding creatively, as they always have 
done, to the life-system’s strategic demand (Snooks 2008a), they will be forced to 
respond mechanically to a set of artificially imposed goals. Goals based on 
metaphysical values rather than existential realities. An attempt will be made to 
achieve these antistrategic goals by imposing a large number of major government 
interventions in the form of a carbon tax/trading system, together with a wide range of 
directives, incentives, financial manipulations, public preferences, propaganda (called 
“education”) and persuasion (eventually coercion?) required to force the adoption of 
low-carbon technologies. As shown in Chapter 3, there will also be an attempt to 
manipulate consumer demand and behavior as well as what is produced and how it is 
produced. 
Owing to this web of centralized controls at both the national and international 
levels, the global community will be locked into a range of “alternative” (to fossil 
burning) technologies that are a less economical component of the old industrial 
technological paradigm. As these low-carbon technologies become more efficient  
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they will extend the dying agony of the old exhausting paradigm and, together with 
the mitigation command system firmly in place, will prevent the emergence of the 
new technological paradigm — the real Solar Revolution. In the absence of mitigation 
measures, the rapidly rising costs of the old fossil-fuel technologies, the rapid 
reduction in rates of return on capital invested in these technologies, and the 
stagnation in growth rates will cause a change in our dynamic life-system and 
generate a powerful incentive to invest in an entirely new technological paradigm — 
just as happened in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries in Western 
Europe as the old neolithic paradigm exhausted itself. 
The mitigation engineers, if they can immediately press their plans into action, 
will cause the global economy to stagnate from the middle decades of the twenty-first 
century. In effect, the nirvana of neoclassical economics — global equilibrium — will 
be achieved. But not for long. What my forty-year study of human society has shown 
is that societies within a competitive environment that do not continue to grow, either 
collapse or are taken over by more dynamic countries. As the mitigation economy is 
to be an experiment on a global scale, there will be an attempt to eliminate 
competition between countries, which may prolong the death throes of human 
civilization at least until the end of the twenty-first century. 
Mitigation and revolution scenarios 
We are now in a position to consider two very different scenarios for the twenty-first 
century that have been generated by the dynamic-strategy theory, and to measure their 
dynamic costs and benefits. The alternative scenarios are: 
•  Mitigation Scenario. This is the scenario that would unfold if the climate-
mitigation programs of the IPCC and the Stern Review were fully 
implemented over the reminder of the twenty-first century. The dynamic-
strategy theory suggests that the Mitigation Scenario involves moderate world 
GDP (WGDP) growth (3.0% p.a.) until 2025, owing to the investment 
opportunities provided by the low-carbon technologies despite higher energy 
costs; slower growth (1.0% p.a.) between 2025 and 2050, owing to greater 
government intervention (and, hence, greater market distortion) imposed on 
the progressive exhaustion of the industrial technological paradigm; and 
virtual stagnation (averaging 0.5% p.a.) between 2050 and 2100, owing to the 
global mitigation economy being captured by an exhausted paradigm. Hence, 
growth of WGDP in the Mitigation Scenario slows dramatically once the 
investment opportunities provided by the low-carbon technologies have been 
fully exploited; and progressive stagnation is the outcome of being locked into 
the old exhausted industrial paradigm because of: (a) the shackles imposed by 
a command mitigation economy; (b) the distortion of the dynamic life-system; 
(c) the reduction of pressure driving the technological revolution owing to the 
premature reduction of greenhouse-gas concentrations; and (d) the reduction 
of revolutionary pressure owing to the inevitable slow-down in the economic 
development of the lesser-developed world under the global mitigation 
command economy. Remember, it is assumed that a full-on mitigation 
program will be in place throughout the remainder of the twenty-first century.  
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•  Revolution Scenario. This scenario, as suggested by the dynamic-strategy 
theory, involves a modest, but declining, growth of WGDP (averaging out at 
3.0% p.a.) until 2025, owing to the initial but increasing signs of paradigm 
exhaustion. This deceleration process is expected to continue more 
dramatically between 2025 and 2050 (averaging out at 1.5% p.a.). By the 
middle decades of the twenty-first century our model suggests that the old 
industrial paradigm will be completely exhausted. Around 2050 — give or 
take a decade — the new technological paradigm — the Solar Revolution — 
kicks in and WGDP grows rapidly and exponentially owing to the sudden 
opening up of radically new strategic opportunities (averaging 5.0% p.a., 
which is a conservative rate similar to that achieved between 1950 and 1973: 
see Maddison 2003: 260) until 2100, and beyond. The rate of growth of 
WGDP under the new technological paradigm starts from a low base around 
2050 (owing to its restriction to the pioneering societies), but grows 
exponentially thereafter, as it takes hold and spreads quickly around the globe. 
Both the Mitigation Scenario and the Revolution Scenario generated by the 
dynamic-strategy theory are very different to the conventional growth scenarios 
suggested by the historicist and neoclassical general equilibrium (i.e. static) models, 
which have been modified to include assumptions about climate change by IPCC, 
Stern, Garnaut, and others. The conventional scenarios considerably overestimate the 
growth of the mitigation (or command) economy, as they completely overlook the 
lock-in effect of an exhausting/exhausted industrial technological paradigm (even one 
modified by low-carbon technologies); and they massively underestimate the growth 
of the non-mitigation (strategic or free enterprise) economy, because their models 
cannot capture the technological pathway or the technological paradigm shift. The 
Garnaut Review (2008) spells out its “assumptions” concerning the growth of WGDP: 
it over-optimistically expects WGDP to peak at 4% p.a. in the early 2020s; and even 
more optimistically expects it will fall no lower than 2.5% p.a. by 2075, and 2.0% by 
2100. Like Stern and the IPCC, Garnaut does not recognize the progressive 
constraining influence of the old exhausting technological paradigm up to the about 
2050, and a totally exhausted one thereafter. 
[Fig 5.1 at end of essay] 
The outcomes of the Mitigation and Revolution Scenarios are summarised in 
Table 5.1 and Figure 5.1. In 2007, the world’s GDP in US currency was $65,610 
billion (CIA World FactBook). In the Mitigation Scenario, WGDP increased 
moderately to $111,599 billion in 2025; $142,941 billion in 2050; but only to 
$182,970 billion in 2100 (on the heroic assumption that civilization had not yet 
collapsed under this command system instituted at the urging of the mitigation 
engineers). In contrast, the Revolution Scenario experiences a similar increase to 
$111,599 billion in 2025; a slightly better $161,726 billion in 2050; and then a very 
impressive $1,850,153 billion in 2100 as a result of the real Solar Revolution. Hence, 
WGDP in the Revolution Scenario is greater than that in the Mitigation Scenario in 
2050 by a modest factor of 1.13 but in 2100 by a massive factor of 10.11.  
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Table 5.1  Projected growth of world GDP, 2007–2100 (US$ billion) 
  2007  2025 2050 2100 
  WGDP %  p.a.  WGDP %  p.a. WGDP  %  p.a. WGDP 
Mitigation  65,610  3.0 111,599  1.0 142,941  0.5       182,970 
Revolution 65,610  3.0  111,599 1.5  161,725 5.0  1,850,153 
Note: These calculations abstract from price changes. 
Source: See text 
This then is the real cost — the dynamic rather than the static cost — of 
imposing a comprehensive climate-mitigation program on humanity. As shown in 
Table 5.2, rather than being a modest 1 percent of WGDP per annum, as argued by 
Stern and other climate-mitigation economists, the real cost of a full-on mitigation 
program would be at least a worrying 12 percent by 2050, and a massive 
90 percent by 2100. And it would continue to increase into the twenty-first century as 
the global mitigation economy begins to disintegrate owing to antistrategic oppression 
and military conflict. So, what appears to be a modestly costly insurance policy in the 
static virtual world of neoclassical economics, is in the real dynamic world a total 
disaster from which we might never recover. Unless it is aborted before it gets this 
far. Even so, any delay in the emergence of a new technological paradigm will be 
very costly: each year we delay will cost between 12 and 90 percent of WGDP, 
depending at what point the command mitigation economy is dismantled. And, of 
course, it will take years to recover from the collapse of the mitigation economy, just 
as it has for Russia following the collapse of the USSR. While the human cost was 
tragically high in the USSR, this will be dwarfed by the imposition and collapse of the 
global mitigation economy in the twenty-first century. 
Table 5.2  Costs of climate mitigation — dynamic versus static 
  Static costs (Stern) 
% of WGDP) 
Dynamic costs (Snooks) 
(% of WGDP) 
2025 1.0  0.0 
2050 1.0  11.6 
2100 1.0  90.1 
Source: see text. 
The choice of futures, therefore, is a critical one. By adopting the course of 
action proposed in this essay (see Chapter 6), and abandoning the comprehensive 
mitigation program proposed by the IPCC, Stern and the other mitigation engineers, 
before it gets underway, the world will save approximately US$27.7 quadrillion. This 
is an enormous sum of money — 28 million, billion US dollars (or 28 followed by 15 
zeros) — and is represented graphically by the triangular area between the two curves 
in Figure 5.1. To put this in a context we can more readily understand: at the 
2007 level of world GDP (WGDP) it would take us 422 years to pay for this 
mitigation cost. Surely no rational person, organization, or government would, in the 
light of these results, be rash enough to want to impose a comprehensive mitigation 
program on the world. How likely are my predicted mitigation results? I rate these 
results as “very likely”, owing to the proven explanatory and predictive outcomes of 
the realist dynamic-strategy theory in a wide range of disciplines in the social and 
natural sciences over the past two decades. Indeed, far more likely than current  
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climate projections, which are based on simplistic historicist models that are unable to 
take structural change into account. 
[Fig 5.2 at end of essay] 
In the face of a forthcoming technological revolution, a mitigation program 
would not only be incredibly costly, it would be totally unnecessary. The forthcoming 
technological paradigm shift will release pressure on the environment and radically 
reduce greenhouse-gas emissions. Figure 5.2 shows schematically the changes in 
carbon dioxide concentrations in the atmosphere expected under both the Revolution 
and Mitigation Scenarios. The mitigation scenarios for carbon dioxide concentrations 
are taken from IPCC reports. The Mitigation I concentrations pathway is that 
expected if the full-on climate-mitigation program is undertaken seriously and 
immediately on a global scale. It shows CO2 concentrations rising from present levels 
of about 350 ppm to about 450 ppm by 2075 and then stabilizing at that level over the 
next century. The Mitigation II concentrations pathway climbs at a higher rate until it 
reaches 550 ppm around 2150, and then levels off. Its higher levels are the result of 
delays in implementing the full mitigation program. Global temperatures are expected 
to be higher as a consequence of this tardiness. 
Figure 5.2 also shows the expected concentrations pathway under the 
Revolution Scenario predicted by the dynamic-strategy model. Between 2000 and 
2050, its levels are expected to be higher than those under mitigation, but, owing to 
the slow-down of growth, the rate of increase of concentrations between 2025 and 
2050 will also slow down. But after 2050 when the real Solar Revolution kicks in, 
concentrations will begin to fall, slowly at first but then more rapidly. The present 
scientific consensus is that current carbon dioxide concentrations can only be 
reabsorbed into the carbon dioxide “sinks” – the deep oceans and the earth – slowly 
over the next couple of centuries (Pittock 2006: 12–14). Recently, some scientists 
have even controversially suggested that this process will take hundreds of thousands 
of years – that it “will last longer than Stonehenge, longer than time capsules, far 
longer than the age of human civilization so far”(Archer et al 2009). While the 
consensus viewpoint is a myopic, the controversial viewpoint is essentially defeatist. 
Fortunately, both viewpoints – which implicitly assume that future technology (even 
over the next few hundred thousand years) will be limited to what can be achieved 
within the current industrial technological paradigm – are fatally flawed owing to 
their failure to develop a realist general dynamic theory of society.  
More realistically, the dynamic-strategy model suggests that technological 
breakthroughs (in response to strategic demand) will occur in the area of carbon 
dioxide absorption, particularly from 2075, as a spin off from the technological 
paradigm shift. My model further suggests that by 2200 carbon dioxide concentrations 
(around 300ppm) could approach levels that were experienced in the late eighteenth 
century (around 280ppm). Even by 2100 they could be in the vicinity of those 
experienced in the late twentieth century (around 350ppm), which compares favorably 
with the mitigation level of between 450–500ppm.   Temperatures will, with a lag, 
also follow this rise in the first half of the twenty-first century, but will fall thereafter 
to levels that by 2100 will be comparable with those in the nineteenth century. Hence, 
the great irony is that by the end of the twenty-first century carbon dioxide  
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concentrations and, hence, temperatures will be much higher under all versions of the 
climate-mitigation program than if we follow the dictates of the dynamic life-system 
as we have always done. Climate mitigation will make the planet much warmer 
than if we merely allow the forthcoming technological revolution to take its 
course. 
Whatever course of action we take, major investment in adaptation programs 
will be required to minimize the impact of climate change already in the pipeline and 
as a result of rising greenhouse-gas concentrations to 2050. This will involve 
expenditures in repairing damage inflicted by more frequent and more severe storms; 
undertaking capital works to limit the damage from more regular flooding; to invest in 
greater water catchment, conservation and distribution; to repair drought devastated 
lands; to enable populations to shift to less flood-prone, drought-prone, fire-prone and 
storm-prone regions; and to invest in restorative technologies. Most of these 
expenditures would also have been required under the various mitigation regimes. We 
know this can be done because our dynamic life-system, which ensures our survival 
and prosperity, was shaped by large and abrupt climate-change events. Adapting to 
future climate change will be even more feasible owing to the modern world’s greater 
technical proficiency. 
MITIGATION AS AN AGENT OF COLLAPSE 
The range of mitigation outcomes summarized in Figure 5.1 is the most optimist 
version of what will happen in the twenty-first century if the world adopts the 
comprehensive program advocated by the mitigation engineers. As argued above, a 
full-on mitigation program will lock us into the old exhausted industrial paradigm 
from the middle decades of this century, and lead to economic stagnation from which 
we will be unable to escape. No antistrategic society, especially once it has stagnated, 
as it inevitably will, can last for long. 
The USSR is an excellent example of a society hijacked by antistrategists, 
which totally lost its way. As the goals, directives and incentives were determined 
metaphysically (in response to philosophical ideas) rather than strategically (in 
response to the life-system via strategic demand), the USSR lost all direction, became 
increasingly inefficient and unproductive and, within the space of just seven decades, 
collapsed. In the pre-industrial era when conquest was an economic strategy, Russia 
and its satellites would have been invaded and taken over by other more viable 
European countries. 
A similar fate awaits the global economy hijacked by the mitigation engineers. 
In a world dominated by antistrategic goals and incentives — a world in which the 
strategists are unable to respond to strategic demand generated by the dynamic life-
system — the only option for those wanting to survive and prosper will be for 
regional strongmen to defect from the climate-mitigation regime, and to pursue the 
only dynamic strategy available to them — war and conquest. This will bring them 
into conflict with the leaders of the global mitigation society, which will be backed up 
by multi-national military forces. In effect, the mitigation engineers will plunge us all 
back into the conditions that dominated the pre-Industrial Revolution era.  
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Why is this so? In a world where technological revolution and population 
increase are blocked by the Masters of Mitigation – the political leaders of the global 
mitigation society – the only way of generating economic expansion is through war 
and conquest. There are no other dynamic strategies that can be employed for this 
purpose. Needless to say, war and conquest is a zero-sum game, in which the victors 
gain at the expense of the vanquished. And in an era of nuclear weapons, it could even 
be an end game. 
While a world that ends in Armageddon is an improvable outcome, it is not an 
impossible one. It will depend on how determined the Masters of Mitigation are to 
impose their metaphysical values on the world and whether they have been able to 
gain complete political control. It would probably take the emergence of a mitigation 
dictator to get this far. Improbable? Yes. Impossible? No. Who in the late 1920s and 
early 1930s believed that the author of Mein Kampf would ever become dictator of 
Germany or that he would be able to bring continental Europe to its knee? Dictators 
emerge out of economic chaos and insecurity, and a full-on mitigation policy would 
certainly produce these conditions on a global scale. Even the ephemeral financial 
crisis of late 2008 and early 2009 – which has been talked up to a global recession by 
the usual doomsters – has led to the re-emergence of the metaphysical 
interventionists. At the recent (February 2009) World Economic Forum at Davos, the 
German chancellor Angela Merkel and the British prime minister Gordon Brown 
advocated the establishment of a UN economic council modeled on the Security 
Council to “police” the global economy and to “enforce” new standards of finance on 
individual nations. The states represented on the council would become “the 
guardians of economic and social order”. Chancellor Merkel insisted that the world 
requires “clear-cut rules quite in contrast to an unfettered capitalism”, which should 
be “enshrined in the form of a global economic order charter”. This interventionist 
plan is to be presented to the April 2009 G20 summit in London on the “financial 
crisis”, and is certain to be supported by countries such as Australia (where prime 
minister Rudd has recently mad a commitment to “social democratic” intervention in 
banking and financial markets in order to “save the system of open markets from sel-
destruction”). If large-scale global intervention can re-emerge at merely the hint of 
economic recession, imagine the reaction if climate change does cause substantial 
actual dislocation.  
Possibly more realistically, an unfolding Mitigation Scenario would lead to a 
growing realization in saner societies that this policy was distorting the global 
dynamic system and leading the nations of the world into real and deep economic 
crisis. This might be sufficient to result in some nations defecting from the climate-
mitigation cabal, possibly with the use of force. While this might not lead to collapse, 
it would certainly result in a much-delayed emergence of the real Solar Revolution — 
probably beyond 2100 — which would cost humanity dearly (as suggested in 
Table 5.1). Climate mitigation or technological revolution? The choice is ours, and it 





What’s to be Done? 
The world has arrived at a major crossroad. We are considering embarking on the 
greatest and most dangerous adventure in our entire history. And we are thinking of 
doing so on the flimsiest of information and knowledge. While the science of climate 
change is reputable and impressive, the message it has delivered is clear but 
concerning: we can only understand how climate will change in the future if we 
understand the dynamics of human society, owing to the influence of human activities 
on global warming. This is concerning because the traditional social sciences are 
unable to explain the dynamics of human society. 
Without a realist general dynamic theory of human society the social sciences 
are unable to deal with the big issues of life, such as human-induced climate change. 
Consequently they have no idea how human society and human activity will unfold 
over the next century. Hence, the traditional experts cannot tell us how human-
induced climate will change during this period. This is hardly a good basis from 
which to launch a comprehensive climate-mitigation program — a program that will 
entail massive government intervention in the global economy, including the 
distortion of the market mechanism and the employment of centrally determined 
directives and incentives, direct government involvement, the exercise of preferences 
for low-carbon technologies and producers, and the use of propaganda and persuasion 
to change consumer habits. Such a poorly researched and risky enterprise can only be 
regarded as totally reckless. 
WHAT’S BEHIND THIS RECKLESS ADVENTURE? 
Humans possess an inherent fear of the future, together with a compulsion to 
intervene in the world to ensure that it doesn’t collapse. Today this fear has 
manifested itself not only in relation to climate change, but also to the current 
(October 2008) ephemeral financial “crisis”. As I argue in a recently (2008) 
completed book, entitled Dead God Rising, the early emergence and development of a 
belief in superhuman guardians was the outcome of this instinct to survive and 
prosper. It was recognition that, while we humans don’t understand the dynamic life-
system that ensures our survival and prosperity, we do understand that in the past this 
system has broken down many times. The ruins of earlier societies are all around us. 
So, if we don’t understand how this life-system works and what is needed to sustain 
it, then we need to seek out those superhuman guardians who do. Every society in the 
history of our species has invested heavily, with both time and resources, in religions 
designed to gain the support of these special guardians or gods. Every society in the 
history of our species has looked to specialized professionals – the “priestly 
philosophers” – who claim to understand the ways of the guardians, gods, or forces of 
fate. In the past, these were the shamans, wisemen, and priests; today they are the 
climate scientists and orthodox economists. What these priestly philosophers have in 
common is their belief in metaphysical ideas based on a deductive methodology. As 
such, it contrasts with the realist ideas derived from empirical observation employed 
in this essay. When it comes to the big issues facing the future of humanity, it is all a  
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matter of faith not science, owing to their failure to develop a science of societal 
dynamics. 
With the emergence of the dynamic strategy of technological change at the 
time of the Industrial Revolution, science rose to replace religion as a means not only 
of understanding our world but also of influencing it so as to maintain order and 
stability. We believe that, armed with science, we can dispense with the old gods. 
Investment in science — the social as well as the natural variety — is now considered 
a better way to ensure the stability of our world. 
Unfortunately this is not so. Science is unable to provide a better 
understanding of the dynamic life-system today than religion was able to do in the 
past. Certainly science has provided us with considerable knowledge about the 
physical, natural, and human worlds, but it hasn’t been able to show us how they work 
as dynamic systems. What it has provided, however, is greater confidence in 
ourselves. This is a double-edged sword. Once, we believed in the guidance of gods, 
now we believe in our own wisdom and abilities to reform the world. The irony is that 
our understanding of the dynamic life-system is, in orthodox hands, no better today 
than it has ever been; and the danger is that we believe the opposite. 
We need only recall the confidence with which orthodox economists have 
entered the knowledge-free zone of climate mitigation to advise governments about 
launching the world on this reckless adventure. We have seen that economists are 
perfectly happy to employ their static, short-run, marginal theory, together with 
simplistic historicist models, to make judgments about the complex dynamics of 
human society. With a naive cheerfulness they tell us, in effect, that even if this great 
adventure fails it won’t cost us much. 
But as I’ve attempted to show above, orthodox experts are not in a position to 
estimate the costs of a mitigation program if they have no real idea of what it is that 
they are mitigating. How is it possible to estimate the costs of something when we 
don’t know how it will unfold in the future? We desperately need a realist dynamic 
theory about the structural changes our society is currently undergoing and will 
undergo in the future. Only then can we estimate the dynamic as opposed to static 
costs of climate mitigation. As I show in Chapter 5, the dynamic costs are massive. 
THE INEVITABLE FAILURE OF LARGE-SCALE INTERVENTIONS 
It is essential to consider how large-scale, if not global, interventions have turned out 
in the recent past. As mentioned earlier, the largest and most risky of interventions in 
the past was the establishment of the command system of the USSR. This experiment 
— which was massively expensive for the Russian people and their satellites in terms 
of time, resources, and lives — collapsed after a mere three generations. The reason 
for this collapse was that the Marxist interventionists, who devised this command 
economy, knew nothing about the dynamics of their life-system. As I explain in The 
Ephemeral Civilization (1997) they ignored it, abused it, and the Russian people and 
their neighbours paid the cost. 
Another major series of metaphysical interventions can be seen in the 
economic and political manipulation of the lesser-developed world. In Global  
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Transition (1999) I show that the “development industry” has little understanding of 
the real nature of the development process, which I call the “global transition” — a 
process by which the underdeveloped countries on the periphery are gradually drawn 
into the “strategic core” of interacting developed countries. This is also the process by 
which the development potential revealed by the last technological paradigm shift — 
the Industrial Revolution — is gradually and predictably achieved (see Figure 4.2). 
This, in other words, is the predictable dynamic mechanism by which the old 
technological paradigm is exhausted and the new one emerges. 
Not understanding this realist and predictable process, the development 
industry believes the material advancement of poorer countries can only occur 
through its interventions. The curious facts are that while the development industry 
has existed only for about half a century, societal material progress has been taking 
place along an exponential development path for the past two million years. During 
this time, as we have seen, there have been three global transitions and paradigm 
shifts. And between the Industrial Revolution (1780–1830) and the emergence of the 
development industry in the mid-twentieth century, a large number of countries 
passed through the development process without any “expert” advice. If anything, the 
development industry has slowed down the current process of global transition 
through its inappropriate and self-interested interventions. Interestingly, the 
development industry only emerged when European colonialism declined, suggesting 
that it is a way the developed world can exercise a degree of control over the less-
developed world in a post-colonial era under the guise of altruism. Of course not all, 
or even a majority of, participants in the development industry have other than the 
best, if misguided, motives; the same cannot be said, however, for the rich countries 
financing this industry. 
Further, there are many examples of interventions in Third-World countries by 
international organizations, such as the IMF and World Bank, which have been 
responsible for creating economic and social chaos. In The Global Crisis Makers 
(2000), I show that these international organizations have been employed by the 
developed world to impose their own inappropriate neoclassical economic policies — 
such as the deflationary and system-distorting policy of inflation targeting — on 
Third-World countries desperately seeking international aid. Also, through the WTO, 
these same countries are attempting to force neoclassical free-trade principles on 
poorer countries even though at a similar stage of economic development they 
employed tariff protection as a strategic instrument. These international organizations 
have made international aid and trade concessions conditional on the adoption of 
economic programs that undermine the dynamic life-systems of lesser-developed 
countries. While the developed world is wealthy enough to pay the cost of Neoliberal 
policies, lesser-developed countries are not, and, if they take these policies seriously, 
usually descend into economic chaos and war. This has been the case in countries 
such as Yugoslavia and Rwanda. 
My point is that modern interventions in the world generally fail because the 
metaphysically influenced interventionists have no idea how the underlying dynamic 
life-system operates. The examples I’ve provided demonstrate the considerable 
economic and social costs that flow from these ill-advised interventions. Interventions  
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based on ideas and philosophies that have little contact with reality. Yet, as costly as 
these interventions have been, they are only a trial run for the massive global 
intervention being planned by the mitigation engineers. I have provided compelling 
theoretical/empirical reasons for believing that the global climate-mitigation program 
will fail spectacularly, will cost human society massively in terms of lost WGDP, and 
could, if pursued relentlessly, lead to the global collapse of civilization as we know it. 
But the greatest failure of climate mitigation will reside in the fact that it will be to no 
avail, because greenhouse-gas emissions and concentrations under mitigationist 
policies will be much higher than if we just got on with the next technological 
revolution. 
THERE IS A PLACE FOR POSITIVE ACTION 
There is, of course, a role for human remedial action. What we can and must do is to 
come to a thorough understanding of the dynamic life-system that enables us to 
survive and prosper. Instead of studying human society in a short-term, static 
framework, we need to come to grips with the way our dynamic system works. The 
dynamic-strategy theory presented in Chapters 4 and 5 is a good way to start this 
process. Once we understand the system, which has been driving human society for 
the past 2 myrs and life for the past 4,000 myrs, we will be in a position to optimize 
the progress of civilization and the betterment of the natural world by removing 
obstacles to its effective operation. Obstacles that include inappropriate interventions 
— regarding societal goals, price systems, incentives, and technologies — formed by 
other-worldly ideas and philosophies. 
It is essential to be sensitive to the requirements of the dynamic life-system, 
particularly to strategic demand. As we have seen, this is the demand generated by the 
unfolding dynamic strategy for a wide range of strategic inputs such as factors of 
production (land, labor and capital), institutions (societal rules), organizations (social 
networks), together with ideas of all types including those of a technological, cultural 
and strategic nature. In the process of this creative interaction between strategic 
demand and the agents of supply, appropriate goals of society — those ensuring 
survival and prosperity — will be established. Any barriers to the free working of this 
strategic demand-response mechanism, such as inflation targeting, should be 
removed. There is one particularly important area where proactive policy will be 
beneficial, and that is government investment in the general infrastructure of science 
and technological change. We know from the dynamic-strategy theory that the future 
of humanity will be dependent on the pursuit of the dynamic strategy of technological 
change; and we know that the next technological paradigm shift is imminent. The 
sooner the new technological revolution occurs, the lower will be the costs of climate 
change and environmental damage. What is required here is not gambling on any 
particular technological pathway, as that will be determined by individuals and 
companies responding to strategic demand, but investment in the generation of new 
knowledge through appropriate scientific, higher educational, and research facilities. 
A doubling of the current levels of GDP devoted to these activities in the immediate 
future would be a good start. 
While humans are good at responding to what has happened, we have great 
difficulty acting in anticipation of something we think might happen. We rarely  
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understand the consequences of our interventions. This is how we have developed 
genetically as a species — by responding to strategic demand — as explained in my 
book The Selfcreating Mind (2006). Accordingly, investment in “adaptation” policies 
and programs, as well as remedial technologies, is a sensible way to go. 
Under the Revolution Scenario outlined in Chapter 5 — see Figure 5.2 — the 
need for adaptation expenditures will be higher until 2050 than those suggested by the 
mitigation engineers, but thereafter the need for these policies will fall quite rapidly to 
2075, by which time they will have returned to levels lower than today. Even by 2060 
the need for remedial action under the Revolution Scenario will be less than that 
under even the most optimistic Mitigation Scenario (Mitigation I, Figure 5.2). 
Although the Revolution Scenario will probably lead to higher carbon dioxide 
concentrations in the period before 2050, this may not be translated into higher 
temperatures. As mentioned in Chapter 2, there are highly reputable scientists 
specializing in research on solar activity, who are convinced that solar activity and 
output will decline significantly over the next two decades, leading to modest 
reductions in global temperatures. If this does eventuate, it will fortuitously 
compensate for any temporary human-induced pressure on climate. And once solar 
activity increases again, say from the 2030s, we should be in a position 
technologically to reduce the adverse impacts of warmer temperatures on human 
society. Of course, this all comes at a cost, but only a small fraction of the cost of the 
proposed climate-mitigation program. And it is a cost that we can easily monitor, as it 
is for past damage rather than a gamble on possible future damage. But this is not an 
argument in favor of relaxing our remedial vigilance, which must be conscientiously 
maintained. 
There is an important issue here that should be recognized. Our dynamic life-
system is already in the process of correcting the impact we are having on climate, 
and it is taking place unremarkably without any proaction on our part. Indeed, the 
impact of climate on our dynamic life-system will hasten this normal corrective 
action, as the higher costs of doing business under global warming will be reflected in 
a stronger and more urgent strategic demand for technological transformation that will 
generate the real solar revolution. 
The choices facing us in the opening decades of the twenty-first century are 
momentous. We can either get in touch with our dynamic life-system — as our 
species has been trying unsuccessfully to do over the past few hundred thousand years 
— and commit ourselves to the imminent technological revolution, or we can leave 
our heads in the clouds and blindly place our faith in a metaphysically inspired, 
massively interventionist climate-mitigation program. If we choose the path 
advocated by the mitigation engineers, we will pay a very heavy economic and social 
price, from which we may find it difficult to re-emerge. Let there be no doubt that 
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Figure 5.1  World GDP under Mitigation and Revolution scenarios: 2007 to 2100  
Sources: 2007 world GDP level from the CIA World Factbook, PPP weighted. Projections are author’s 




















Figure 5.1a  World GDP under the Mitigation and Revolution scenarios: 2007 to                   
2100: Arithmetic scale ($US Billion) 
 
















Figure 5.2  Carbon dioxide concentrations under Mitigation and Revolution 
scenarios: 2007 to 2200 
Sources: 2007 C02 ppm level from IPCC. Projections are author’s own calculations. 
 
 
 